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IMPLIED RESTRICTIONS ON WORK MOVEMENTS- THE
PERNICIOUS CROW OF LABOR CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION
Owen Fairweather*
Unless the competitive ability of manufacturers in the United States is
made more effective, this country will continue to lose its position in world
markets to competitive adversaries within the Common Market, the Free Trade
Association, and Japan. Moreover, a rapid increase of exports is needed, not
only to regain lost markets, but to make more favorable the commercial balance
of trade and thereby reduce the outflow of gold. Currency devaluation is the
specter over the horizon unless a stable and favorable balance of international
payments can be reestablished.' Therefore, the government is now attempting
to aid manufacturing concerns to sharpen their competitive claws.
This aid is manifest in the tax credits now granted to companies who
purchase labor-cost-reducing equipment2 and in revised depreciation allow-
ances.' Both of these provisions are designed to lower the cost of equipment
which reduces labor costs, and hence, to encourage its purchase. The govern-
ment, therefore, is aiding the race toward more automation because the labor
cost per unit of manufactured products must go down if total exports are to
be expanded.
Another part of the government effort to encourage exports was the enact-
ment of the Trade Expansion Act last fall. 4 This Act granted the President
the authority to trade tariff reductions with the managers of the Common
Market in the hope that from such trading our exports would grow more than
our imports and the net commercial trade balance in terms of dollars would
be improved.
However, as this national policy of encouraging exports is being formulated,
there is at work a countervailing development dulling competitive potential
and raising costs. Some arbitrators and judges, when asked to construe collec-
tive bargaining agreements between labor unions and manufacturing companies,
are constructing by implication restrictions on the subcontracting of work. Such
prohibitions upon purchases from subcontractors block a competitive process
which is often referred to as the "make or buy" decision. The decision to "make
or buy" a product or provide a service is normally predicated upon a cost
analysis, and the purchase from the outsider only occurs when costs can be
reduced thereby.
* Partner, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, A.B. 1935, Dartmouth
College; J.D. 1938, Univ. of Chicago.
1 Vanek, Overvaluation of the Dollar, Causes, Effects, and Remedies, in JOINT ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE, 87TH CONG., 2D SEss., FACTORS AFFECTING THE UNITED STATES BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS 267 (Comm. Print 1962); Houthakker, Exchange Rate Adjustment, in JOINT
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 8
7 TH CONG., 2D SESs., FACTORS AFFECTING THE UNITED STATES
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 287 (Comm. Print 1962). [hereinafter cited as Factors].
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 46-48.
3 2 CCH 1963 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1763.
Robert V. Roosa, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs explained that the
tax credit for investment and the revised depreciation guidelines were designed to aid the
private economy to penetrate export markets so as to retard the balance of payments drain.
Factors 334.
4 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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Paradoxically, such blocking of "make or buy" decisions has been oc-
curring in this country by arbitration and judicial decision during a period
when the European competitors have been obtaining rapid cost decreases
by purchasing goods and services from subcontractors. Specialists are springing
up in the enlarged common market trading area' because European business
managers have discovered the principle, identified by Adam Smith in 1776,
that one of the major advantages in an expansion in an industrial market is
the reduction in cost obtainable from specialization.6 These European man-
agers are actively exploiting this principle,' while many in this country are
being restrained.
In addition to blocking purchases from subcontractors, thereby restricting
trade and holding up costs, the same group of arbitrators and judges are impos-
ing another trade restriction when they follow a parallel course. They are con-
struing labor agreements with unions to block the movement of work from
one plant to another operated by the same company where the same or similar
product can be produced at a lower and more competitive cost.
The following cases illustrate these imposed "work movement" restrictions.
In Vulcan Rivet & Bolt Corp.," a company violated its labor agreement when
it contracted to purchase T-head bolts at a lower cost from a supplier. It was
directed to reassign the T-head bolt production at a higher cost to its own
employees. In Pet Milk Co.,0 a company violated its labor agreement when
it contracted with a trucking company to ship ice cream mix, previously shipped
by railroad. The company was directed to employ its own drivers and ship
the mix in company-owned trucks. In Bridgeport Brass Co. ° a company violated
its labor agreement when it sold its railroad locomotive after it discovered that
the servicing railroad would switch cars in its rail yard at no cost. The com-
pany was directed to rehire the locomotive crew and have it stand by even
though there was no locomotive to operate. Finally, in International Harvester
Co.," a company violated its labor agreement when it moved work from one
of its plants to another. It was directed to return the work to the former plant.
If these examples of restrictions upon the use of the services of others and
the movement of work to different plants were isolated cases, the trade restric-
tion effect could be dismissed as de minimis. However, there are many such
arbitration awards. If such awards are sound, they will multiply and rigidity
in our free economy will mushroom.
There are, of course, decisions which reject the reasoning behind these
5 Markham, Competition in the European Common Market, in Factors 135; Kravis,
Common Market- Lesson in Trade Expansion, 40 HARv. Bus. Rav. No. 2, Mar.-Apr. pp.
6, 12 (1962).
6 Adam Smith wrote that "The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market."
SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, BOOK I., Chap. III (1776).
7 For the theoretical argument behind the conclusion that specialization by independent
suppliers of goods and services reduces costs and therefore prices, see STIGLER, THE THEORY
OF PRICE 145-147 (1952).
8 36 Lab. Arb. 871 (R. R. Williams, 1961). See also, A. D. Julliard Co., Inc., 21
Lab. Arb. 713 (J. A. Hogan, 1953) where the subcontracting of certain work which would
have reduced cost $450,500 a year was not permitted.
9 33 Lab. Arb. 278 (W. P. McCoy, 1959).
10 25 Lab. Arb. 151 (J. F. Donnelly, S. F. Curry; W. L. Mottram dissenting, 1955).
11 24 Lab. Arb. 332 (D. L. Cole, 1955).
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cases. In sharp contrast to the group of contract interpreters who imply restric-
tions on work movements, there is a substantial group who flatly refuse to do
SO. 
12
Between these two groups fall others. They do not subscribe to either
view- apparently because they conclude the opposed views represent extremes.
They approve of work movements to subcontractors or to other plants if the
managerial action was taken in "good faith."' " However, what they individually
mean by "good faith" varies considerably. The diversity of their views sug-
gests that it may be the personal opinions of the arbitrators rather than sound
contract construction principles that are the actual standards.
This diversity of views creates a condition which is unsound. What limi-
tations do or do not exist under the terms of a labor agreement upon the move-
ment of work to subcontractors or to other manufacturing locations should be
predictable by a rational process of language construction. It should not depend
upon the chance involved in the selection of the arbitrator who reviews the
grievance.' 4
Competent analytical studies of work movement decisions have been pub-
lished.'5 Various arbitrators have made exhaustive catalogues of the actions
of other arbitrators. 6 However, these studies generally consist of an analysis
of what arbitrators have, in fact, done, rather than an analysis of the logic of
their actions. For example, D. A. Crawford, in his well-known paper presented
to the National Academy of Arbitrators, admitted he attempted to rationalize
the various awards into a pattern when he said:"
To return to the awards, if they are analyzed in terms of the
factual decisions made rather than the doctrine articulated the fog
of Omar Khayyam dispels, revealing a loaf of bread but no jug
of wine. A pattern of consistent decision making- however incon-
sistently articulated - emerges.
This process of cataloguing results and then seeking a consistent rationale
justifying these results is backward rationalization. It would seem more appro-
priate to analyze critically the "articulations" which arbitrators use to support
a conclusion that the movement of work to a subcontractor or to another plant
violated or did not violate the applicable labor agreement.
It is hoped that this analysis of "articulations" will permit some light to
12 Cases cited notes 76-78 infra. The presence of opposed views was noted by Arbitrator
R. Smith in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1213, 1217 (1962):
Both parties . . .make extensive reference to the decisions of other arbi-
trators in the area of subcontracting... [I~t is literally possible to cite prior
decisions which range throughout the entire spectrum of possibilities. Some,
at the one extreme, hold that, absent a specific contractual restriction,
the employer retains complete freedom in the matter. Others, at the other
extreme, hold that the employer is prohibited from contracting out any
work normally performed by unit employees.
13 See cases cited note 107 infra.
14 Arbitrator Elmer E. Hilpert noted that the cleavage between "schools of arbitrators"
on implied restrictions on work movements is so sharp that one might conclude that the
decision in such a case would depend on the "school" to which the arbitrator belonged.
Allis-Chalmers Co., Cases No. 13-14, '59-'62 (1963).
15 See generally Crawford, The Arbitration of Disputes over Subcontracting, in CHAL-
LENGES TO ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH ANNUAL MEETING OF NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 51 (1960).
16 Arbitrator Allen Dash made a well-publicized review of the cases in Celanese Corp.
of America, 33 Lab. Arb. 925 (1959).
17 Crawford, op. cit. supra note 15, at 67.
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pierce the clouds of confusion surrounding arbitration decisions in this area.
The first part of this analysis will consider the construction theories which
arbitrators have applied; the second part will consider the possible conflicts
which may exist between a finding by an arbitrator that a labor contract prevents
one employer from doing business with another and some fundamental legal
and economic doctrines.
I
THE RATIONALE OF ARBITRATORS AND JUDGES
IN "WORK MOVEMENT" DECISIONS
Although the contract construction theories used in the work movement
cases run through the entire spectrum of possibilities, these theories can be
grouped for analysis. The first group to be considered are the construction
theories supporting an implied restriction on "work movements." Then, theories
of those who refuse to imply restrictions will be analyzed. Finally, the theories
of those who would permit work movements made in good faith will be explored.
A. Theories Supporting Implied Restrictions
Where labor agreements contain no explicit contractual language to bar
work from flowing to subcontractors or lower cost plants,"8 those arbitrators
and judges, who imply restrictions, have turned to one, or a combination of
several standard labor contract clauses to find the implied contractual intention
to limit subcontracting or work transfer. 9 The standard provisions of labor
agreements most often used, singly or in combination, as the "source" of the
restriction are: (1) The recognition clause; (2) The seniority clause; (3) The
list of job classifications; (4) The union shop clause.
Recognition and seniority clauses and job classification lists are found in
all labor agreements. Union shop clauses are standard clauses in the labor agree-
ments in many industries.
If it follows that these standard clauses, singly or in combination, can
prevent companies (1) from subcontracting work to specialists to reduce costs,
18 Explicit contractual limitations on subcontracting are rare. A recent study by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that only four out of the 1,687 collective bargaining
agreements examined contained provisions expressly forbidding subcontracting. U. S. DEPT.
OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULLETIN No. 1304, Subcontracting Clauses in
Major Collective Bargaining Agreements 4 (1961). Where express prohibitions on work
movement have been incorporated, their legality might well be questioned under Section
8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act and the antitrust laws. See the text accompanying
notes 121-67. See Philadelphia Dress Joint Board v. Sidele Fashions, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 97
(E.D. Pa. 1960); Selb. Mfg. Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 834 (J. M. Klamon, 1961); but see Carey
v. General Electric Co., 50 L.R.R.M. 2119 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
19 Sometimes, a restriction is found without identification of its contractual source.
E.g., Vulcan Rivet & Bolt Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 871 (R. R. Williams, 1961). In this case
the arbitrator's finding that subcontracting work was improper was based on the following
erroneous conclusion as to the meaning of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960):
Where the agreement contains no specific reference to contracting out of
work, it has been held by the United States Supreme Court that, since the
agreement does not allow contracting out, the employer may not unilaterally
contract out the work within the job classification covered by the agree-
ment. 36 Lab. Arb. at 872.
No contractual language was relied on by Arbitrator J. Fred Holly when he implied a
limitation on subcontracting, stating it was the current popular view in Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co. 36 Lab. Arb. 695 (1961). This award was rendered after the company
lost the nonarbitrability issue before the Supreme Court. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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or (2) from transferring work to more efficient plants to reduce costs, the
resulting restriction on industrial efficiency will rapidly spread throughout
unionized industry. The barriers on trade that would be created would be
similar to tariff walls surrounding each unionized plant preventing external
competition from attacking the high costs within. Before concluding that
unionized plants should be considered immunized from such competition, the
rationale underlying the implied restrictions based on each standard labor
agreement clause relied upon as the foundation for the restriction should be
critically examined.
1. The Recognition Clause As a Basis For An Implied Restriction on Work
Movements. - The "recognition clause" is the statement in a labor agreement
that the employer recognizes a particular union as the exclusive bargaining
agent of employees in the appropriate unit represented by the union. Arbitra-
tors have said that this clause implies an agreement that the employer will
not, by managerial decision, remove work from the employees in the appro-
priate unit by subcontracting it to others.2" They have said that unless there
is this implied agreement not to remove work there could be "a violation of
the spirit, intent and purpose of such collective agreement";21 the unit could
be emasculated" or shrunk;"3 the entire agreement could be nullified. 4
Arbitrator C. R. Schedler in U. S. Potash Co." articulated this theory,
saying:
[T]here is no express language either prohibiting or authorizing
contracting out. What is more significant is that the contract
contains a clause recognizing the Union. .. . The infraction here
is in the unavoidable effect on these rights. To me it is clear that
the work belonged to the unit, which contained employees fully
capable of executing it.... [Tjhe contracting out had the inevitable
impact of derogating the Union's status as recognized exclusive
representative.2 6
20 Recognition clause as a basis for the restriction: U. S. Potash Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 442
(C. R. Schedler, 1961); Mead Paper Corp., 37 Lab. Arb. 342 (L. T. Hawley, 1961);
Container Corp. of America, 37 Lab Arb. 252 (H. T. Dworet, 1961); Vulcan Rivet & Bolt
Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 871 (R. R. Williams, 1961); Socony Mobil Oil Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 631
(R. G. McIntosh, 1960); Gulf Oil Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. 852 (D. A. Crawford, 1959);
Continental Can Co. 7 Basic Steel Arb. 4975 (M. H. Schmidt, 1959); Pet Milk Co., 33
Lab. Arb. 278 (W. P. McCoy, 1959); Electric Auto-Lite Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 449 (A. R.
Marshall, 1958); Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 30 Lab. Arb. 26 (H. W. Hoel, 1957)
(dictum); Continental Can Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 67 (J. F. Sembower, 1956); Thompson
Grinder Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 671 (W. P. McCoy, 1956); Temco Aircraft Corp., 27 Lab. Arb.
233 (L. V. Larson, 1956); Bridgeport Brass Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 151 (J. F. Donnelly and
S. F. Curry; W. L. Mottram dissenting, 1955); General Metals Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. 118
(M. Lennard, 1955); Weber Aircraft Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 821 (E. A. Jones, 1955); Devoe
& Raynolds, 22 Lab. Arb. 608 (A. R. Porter, 1954); Koppers Co., Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 124
(B. M. Reid, 1954); Journal Publishing Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 108 (H. Seering, Chrn., S. L.
Wycoff, J. B. Abramson; W. W. Knight and W. D. Rodbury dissenting, 1954); A. D. Julliard,
21 Lab. Arb. 713 (J. A. Hogan, 1953); Stockholders Publishing Co., Inc., 16 Lab. Arb.
644 (B. Aaron, 1951); Parke Davis & Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 111 (1. B. Scheiber, 1950); Celanese
Corp. of America, 14 Lab. Arb. 31 (S. Wolff, 1950).
21 Parke Davis & Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 111, 115 (I. B. Scheiber, 1950).
22 Gulf Oil Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. 852, 855 (D. A. Crawford, 1959).
23 Electric Auto-Lite Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 449, 454 (A. R. Marshall, 1958).
24 Thompson Grinder Co., Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. 671, 674 (W. P. McCoy, 1956).
25 37 Lab. Arb. 442 (1961).
26 Id. at 448.
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Likewise, Arbitrator W. P. McCoy in Pet Milk Co." espoused the same view
that the act of recognition and bargaining with a union denies to the employer
the right to subcontract work:
A company and union do not bargain for wages, hours, overtime,
etc., in a vacuum. They bargain for the performance of certain
work, and set the terms for such performance. If, having set those
terms, the company can avoid compliance by the simple device of
contracting, the entire contract could become a nullity . . . s
Of the several contractual provisions adopted as a basis for a finding of
an implied limitation preventing the movement of work by subcontracting
or transfer, the recognition clause should be the least susceptible to that inter-
pretation. The recognition clause is only a reflection of the obligation imposed
upon the employer by the National Labor Relations Act. By that Act, an
employer must recognize a union which represents a majority of his employees
in an appropriate unit.2" Certification by the National Labor Relations Board
makes the incorporation of a recognition clause into the labor agreement an
absolute obligation. A refusal to do so would then be bad faith bargaining."0
It is therefore grossly unrealistic to assume that the employer intended to
create a limitation preventing his dealing with subcontractors or moving work to
another plant when a recognition clause, which is merely a reflection of a legal
requirement, is included in the labor agreement. This clause is the only clause
in a labor agreement that is completely nonvolitional.
The view that the legally-required recognition clause is merely descriptive
of the group of employees represented by the union, and, hence, cannot be
considered a clause creating rights is confirmed by the decisions of the National
Labor Relations Board. In Plumbing Contractors Association,"' the Board
said:
As the Board has heretofore held, and as we here reiterate, a
Board certification in a representation proceeding is not a juris-
dictional award; it is merely a determination that a majority of
the employees in an appropriate unit have selected a particular labor
organization as their representative for purposes of collective bar-
ganing... [T]his determination by the Board does not freeze the
duties or work tasks of the employees in the unit found appro-
priate.32 (Footnotes omitted.)
This same reasoning is followed in unfair labor practice proceedings. In
United Steelworkers,3 the union picketed and filed a charge because work
was contracted out. The Board found no legal restriction against "contracting
out" despite the fact that the agreement contained a standard "recognition
clause."
Courts have reacted similarly to the assertion that a recognition clause
27 33 Lab. Arb. 278 (1959).
28 Id. at 279.
29 NLRB v. Taitel, 261 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 944 (1959).
30 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); H. J. Heinz Co. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
31 93 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1951).
32 Id. at 1087. Accord, Heating, Piping & Air Conditioning Contractors, Cincinnati
Association, 110 N.L.R.B. 261 (1954); General Aniline & Film Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 467
(1950).
33 127 N.L.R.B. 823 (1960), enfd, 294 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1961).
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supports a restriction on contracting out work. Judge Aldrich said in Local
1509, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Electric Ry. Workers v. Eastern Massa-
chusetts Street Ry.: 4
I hold that the union recognition clause and the classification
clause do not even raise an arbitrable question as to the defendant's
obligation not to contract out fare box work.
In one of the earliest reported arbitration cases concerning subcontracting
Emanuel Stein rejected the claim that the recognition clause prevented the
employer from abolishing the jobs of its guards and employing an outside
property protection service. 5 He brushed aside as irrelevant the claim that
the employer's action was vulnerable because it would "shrink or alter the bar-
gaining unit." Many arbitrators since then have done the same."
The purpose of a recognition clause was well explained by Arbitrator M.
Beatty in American Sugar Refining Co." He said that clause did not create
a guarantee that work once performed by employees in an appropriate unit
would always be done by them:
The purpose of this clause is to assure fulfillment of the Com-
pany's legal obligation to bargain with this Union and assures that
this particular Union may represent all hourly paid employees in
this plant. It is stretching the point, I believe, to argue that it also
means that the Union has jurisdiction over all work which this
employer has or which is customarily done by these employees, or
that all such work will remain with these employees. The contract
does not provide jurisdiction over work or detract substantially from
management's customary right to direct the working force, or to
determine what work will be done and how.
38
Another complete answer to those who seek to base a restriction on work
movements on the recognition clause is found in an award by Arbitrator Herman
A. Gray in Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc.:"5
It is the Guild's contention that the recognition clause consti-
tutes an agreement on the part of the Company that all work com-
ing within the designated occupations will remain in the hands of
employees for whom the Guild speaks and who will, therefore, con-
tinue to enjoy the coverage and the benefits of the Guild's collec-
tive agreement. The Guild cites a number of decisions by arbitrators
34 162 F. Supp. 942, 944 (D. Mass. 1958). See also Amalgamated Assn. of Street Electric
Ry. Workers v. Greyhound Corp., 231 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1956).
35 Cords, Ltd., Inc., 7 Lab. Arb. 748 (E. Stein, 1947).
36 The recognition clause was specifically rejected as a basis for restricting work move-
ment in the following cases: Allis-Chalmers Co., Cases No. 13, 14, '59-'62 (E. Hilpert,
1963); Olin Mathieson Chemical Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1147 (T. J. McDermott, 1961); Ameri-
can Sugar Refining Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 409 (D. A. Crawford, 1960); Columbus Bolt &
Forging Co., 35 Lab. Arb. 397 (V. L. Stouffer, 1960); Black-Clawson Co., 34 Lab. Arb.
215 (E. R. Teple, 1960); Minneapolis-Moline Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 893 (P. M. Kelliher, 1960);
Lukens Steel Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 228 (D. A. Crawford, 1959); Reynolds Metals Co., 32 Lab.
Arb. 815 (C. W. Anrod, 1959); Cooperative Farm Chemicals Ass'n, 31 Lab. Arb. 482
(A. L. Coffey, 1958); Richmond Baking Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 493 (C. A. Warns, 1957);
Dairy Workers v. Detroit Creamery Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 677 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne Co.,
1956); Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 568 (S. L. Cahn, 1956); Carbide and
Carbon Chemicals Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 158 (P. M. Kelliher, 1955); Vickers, Inc., 24 Lab.
Arb. 121 (R. W. Haughton, 1955); Dalmo Victor Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 33 (S. Kagel, 1954);
National Sugar Refining Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 991 (I. R. Feinberg, 1949).
37 37 Lab. Arb. 334 (1961).
38 Id. at 336.
39 26 Lab. Arb. 723, 725 (1956).
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who, in like cases coming before them, have decided on the basis
of reasoning very like that advanced by the Guild, that the recog-
nition clause operates to bar an employer from shifting any of the
work coming within the purview of the agreement to a sub-
contractor whose own employees then proceed to perform the work,
but not under the terms of the agreement since they are not the
employees of the contracting employer.
I have read and carefully weighed each of these decisions. I
confess myself unable to accept the reasoning whereby the arbitra-
tors' conclusions were reached. I think it gives to the recognition
clause of the collective agreement a scope and effect which it is
not designed to have and should not have.
In my view the purpose of the recognition clause is no more than
to enunciate the legal status of the bargaining union. It describes
the unit of the employees for whom the union treats and thus de-
lineates the operative scope of the agreement itself. It serves no
substantive function. That is, it does not deal with and has no
bearing upon the terms and conditions governing the employment
itself. These constitute the subject matter of the body of the agree-
ment which follows the introductory words of the preamble. To
read substantive provisions into the recognition clause through
arbitration decisions is, in my judgment to use arbitration as a
means for expanding the agreement which the parties have made
rather than just interpreting and applying its provisions in specific
situations.
I am, therefore, constrained to hold that the recognition clause
contained in the preamble does not by itself prevent the Company
from turning over to an independent contractor any of the work
covered by the collective agreement, thereafter to be performed by
the employees of such independent contractor rather than by
employees of the Company. And, if the recognition clause does
not prevent subcontracting, then there is nothing else in the agree-
ment before this Board which does. The right to subcontract is
one of the powers possessed by management. If the collective agree-
ment places no express limitation on the exercise of this power,
as this one does not, then it must be held that it remains intact.
And it is most significant that Arbitrator Saul Wallen, who has been
referred to as the person who probably set off the implied limitation contro-
versy,4" now rejects the view that a recognition clause supports such a limitation.
In Hershey Chocolate Corp.,4 Wallen said:
The contracting out work, . . . does not violate the recognition
clause. That clause binds the employer to recognize the Union
as the bargaining agent for those employees whom he employs
to produce the goods or services in which he deals. It does not bind
him to continue unchanged his mode of doing business nor does
it automatically bar him, regardless of circumstances, from pur-
chasing services formerly supplied by his own employees.
4 2
The recognition clause, derived as it is from the employer's obligation
under the National Labor Relations Act to recognize a union as the repre-
sentative of certain people describes a group of people and not work. These
40 See Olin Mathieson Chemical Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1147 (T. J. McDermott, 1961).
41 28 Lab. Arb. 491 (1957).
42 Id. at 493.
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clauses appeared universally in collective bargaining agreements soon after
the enactment of the Wagner Act, and "contracting out" was then widespread
in industry. As Arbitrator Elmer Hilpert pointed out, "it is asking too much
to ask one to assume that in one swell [sic] swoop," nearly 30 years after the
law required the clause that it really was an agreement by the management
of a unionized plant to surrender the right to subcontract work or move work
to lower cost plants, which rights had traditionally been "an all important and
widely used managerial power." '
2. The Seniority Clause As The Basis For An Implied Restriction on Work
Movements.-The seniority clause in a labor agreement establishes a pref-
erence for longer service employees over shorter service employees to the work
made available by the employer at a particular location. This clause provides
that the latter (shorter service employees) will be laid off before the former
when a reduction in work occurs. Thus, the typical seniority clause recognizes
that the volume of work available at a particular location may diminish.
In 1947, in New Britain Machine Co.," Arbitrator S. Wallen, indulging
in a flight of rhetoric, found that subcontracting violated the seniority clause,
saying, "If wages is the heart of the labor agreement, job security may be
considered its soul."4 It may have been these words that initiated the use of
the seniority clause as a basis for an implied restriction on subcontracting
work.46 In any event, it appears that these words have risen to haunt Arbitrator
Wallen, for ten years later he has qualified, if not reversed, his earlier view. In
Hershey Chocolate Corp.,4  he said:
[T]he seniority provisions guarantee, not a constant employment
opportunity for each category of employees covered by the contract,
but a set of rules for the parcelling out of employment opportunities,
the availability of which can be affected by diminution of work
volume due to changes in the market, due to changes in technology,
or due to changes in the realm of good faith managerial decision-
making.
48
That seniority clauses only establish relative rights to available work and are
not in any sense creators of contractual claims to work was explained by Arbi-
trator M. Beatty in American Sugar Refining Co.4 9 where he noted:
The seniority provisions of a working agreement are for the pur-
pose of determining relative status of employees, which status
entitles senior employees to certain preferences for purposes of pro-
43 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., Cases No. 13-14, '59262 (Elmer E. Hilpert, 1963).
44 8 Lab. Arb. 720 (1947).
45 Id. at 722.
46 Seniority Clause as basis for the restriction: Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 814 (1961); Selb Mfg. Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 834 (J. M.
Klamon, B. A. Barken, C. Bingamon, 1961); U.S. Potash Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 442 (C. R.
Schedler, 1961); Mead Paper Corp., 37 Lab. Arb. 342 (L. T. Hawley, 1961); Metropolitan
Brick Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 394 (E. R. Teple, 1960) (displaced employee cannot be paid lower
rate because of specific provisions); A. D. Julliard Co., Inc., 21 Lab. Arb. 713 (J. A. Hogan,
1953); New Britain Machine Co., 8 Lab. Arb. 720 (S. Wallen, W. Knauss, and H. Kosinski,
1947).
47 28 Lab. Arb. 491 (1957).
48 Id. at 493.
49 37 Lab. Arb. 334 (1961).
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motion, layoff, recall, etc. Seniority carries no guarantee that
jobs will always be provided even for the most senior employees....
It is likely that neither party, the Company nor the Union, con-
templated seniority as having any relevancy to contracting-out at
the time they wrote the contract. In my opinion the seniority pro-
visions are not relevant to this issue.50
A seniority clause explains which employees will be laid off when work
is reduced. It is not an agreement not to reduce work. Thus, the rejection
of this basis for an implied restriction on subcontracting by many arbitrators
appears to be based on a realistic analysis of the intention of the parties when
they incorporated the seniority clause into the agreement."
The most recent resurgence of the view that an employee obtains a right
- in the nature of a property right - in the work itself from a seniority
clause occurred when Judge Madden, sitting temporarily in the Second [Circuit]
Court of Appeals, released the opinion in Zdanok v. Glidden Co. 2 The Company
closed down a plant in Long Island, New York where its "Durkees Dressing"
had been manufactured and commenced manufacturing the same product at
a plant in Pennsylvania.
The language Judge Madden used caused a stir. He indicated that "rights"
to work are earned, that they arise by implication from the total agreement
as well as from the seniority clause and that they continue to exist even after the
collective bargaining agreement expires. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge
Lumbard pointed out how this view departed from established doctrine.5 3
The federal cases hold that seniority is not inherent in the
employment relationship but arises out of the contract... . If rights
are to persist beyond the term of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, the agreement must so provide or be susceptible of such
construction.
Some clarification is now piercing the confusion. The theory of Judge
Madden is being rejected, distinguished and explained away. The first federal
court rejection of the Glidden theory was by a District Court in New Jersey.
50 Id. at 336.
51 The view that a typical seniority clause supports an implied restriction on subcontract-
ing was specifically rejected in Tungsten Mining Corp., 19 Lab. Arb. 503 (D. B. Maggs,
1952); Phillips Pipe Line Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 432 (A. L. Coffey, 1953); Carbide and Carbon
Chemicals Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 158 (P. M. Kelliher, 1955); American Sugar Refining Co.,
36 Lab. Arb. 409 (D. A. Crawford, 1960); Reactive Metals, Inc., 62-2 ARB f8495 (T. G.
Begley, 1962); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., Cases No. 13-14; '59-'62 (E. E. Hilpert, 1962).
52 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 814 (1961). The Glidden case is
returning to the Second Circuit, having been certified back on the question of whether
federal law rather than state law should have been applied in view of the Supreme Court's
holding in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
53 Id. at 105. The pre-Glidden law referred to by Judge Lumbard had been enunciated
in the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits. In System Federation No. 59 v. Louisiana & Ark.
Ry., 119 F.2d 509, 515 (5th Cir. 1941), the Fifth Circuit said that "collective bargaining
agreements do not create a permanent status, give an indefinite tenure, or extend rights
created and arising under the contract, beyond its life. . . ." The Sixth Circuit said in
Elder v. New York Central RR., 152 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1945), that seniority rights were
only created by the express language of the agreement and did not survive the termination
of the agreement which had created them. The Seventh Circuit said in International Asso-
ciation of Machinists v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
884 (1959), that seniority rights are limited to those clearly expressed and do not survive
termination. See also UAW v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., 36 L.R.R.M. 2357 (D. Conn.
1955).
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In Giordano v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 4 the employer moved work from a plant
in New Jersey to one in Maryland. A group of employees dissatisfied with a
negotiated separation agreement, sued for damages, claiming that they had
vested rights in the work and that these rights under the Glidden theory sur-
vived the expired collective agreement. The court in its opinion rejected the
theory of "vested rights" citing the settled law prior to Glidden.
The Sixth Circuit in Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co.55 reversed a District
Court that had blindly followed Judge Madden's view. That court, consider-
ing whether employees' contractual rights had been violated when a company
moved work from a plant it closed in Michigan to one in Tennessee, said:
Accordingly, we do not have the question of whether plaintiffs'
"vested" rights can be validly terminated by relocation of the plant
in Tennessee. Rather, it is the question of what rights, if any, the
plaintiffs have under the express provisions of the bargaining agree-
ment upon the relocation of the plant in Tennessee. If no rights
were acquired under the bargaining agreement as employees at the
Tennessee plant, it necessarily follows that no rights have been cut
off.
5 6
Although certiorari was denied in the Ross Gear case,5" little significance can
be given to this denial because certiorari also was denied on the merits of the
Glidden decision.58 In view of the two denials one could conclude that the
Supreme Court considers Glidden and Ross Gear to be only interpretations
of contract language and does not feel it is the Court's function to review
contract construction cases.
The beginning of a future disregard of the Glidden doctrine by the Second
Circuit itself is clearly indicated in Procter and Gamble Independent Union
v. Procter and Gamble Mfg. Co.5" Judge Paul Hays said the Glidden holding
did not create implied vested rights in work, but was merely an interpretation
of unique contract language.
Since we hold that Zdanok is inapplicable to the case at bar, we
have no occasion to reexamine the principle on which that decision
was based. We believe, however, that we should say that Zdanok
cannot properly be read to govern situations which are not strictly
within the facts there presented.... [T]he case cannot be made to
stand in any general way for the survival of contractual obligations
during any period beyond the period with which they were expressly
undertaken.
60
Quite uniformly arbitrators have been unimpressed by the Glidden case.
54 49 L.R.R.M. 3082 (D.N.J. 1962).
55 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1962). On the basis of this decision the Federal District
Court for Northern Ohio dismissed an employee suit for damages in Slenezka v. Hoover Ball
and Bearing Company, 215 F. Supp. 761 (1963). The Sixth 'Circuit's refusal to follow
the Glidden doctrine in Ross Gear caused at least the Williams County Circuit Court in
Illinois to reverse a Glidden type decision on its own motion. Bradley v. Sangamo Electric
Co., 129 Daily Labor Report: D-1, June 15, 1962.
56 Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 305 F.2d 143, 149 (1962).
57 371 U.S. 941 (1962).
58 368 U.S. 814 (1961).
59 312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962).
60 Id. at 186.
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Arbitrator R. G. Howlett in Sivyer Steel Casting Co., ' siding with the Sixth
Circuit, said:
I think Judge Miller in Ross Gear & Tool and Judge Lumbard in
Glidden [dissenting] delivered opinions more consistent with recog-
nized relationships between employers and employees and the unions
representing the latter than Judge Madden did. . . .62
Arbitrator Peter M. Kelliher added his rejection in United Packers, Inc.63
and Arbitrator Clair V. Duff his in H. H. Robertson Co." In the latter case
the employees claimed the right to follow transferred work from one division
to another of the same employer. Duff held that the seniority clause established
only relative employment rights at the particular division and rejected the
claim saying no "vested rights" in the transferred work had been created. He
attempted to distinguish the Glidden decision on the basis that it involved a
complete discontinuance of manufacturing at one location, whereas in his case
only a 10% discontinuance took place, and then said:
To expand and extend the legal reasoning set forth in the recent
plant removal cases, to the fact situation here present, would
require different contractual provisions than are here present. An
Arbitrator is not empowered to modify the Contract under the
guise of construction. If such changes in the Contract are desired
they must be sought at the bargaining table.
65
Therefore, it is submitted that an analysis of the purpose and language
of the typical seniority clause plus the current court and arbitration authority
permits the conclusion that a seniority clause does not support an implied
restriction on work movements to subcontractors or to other plants of the same
employer.
3. The List of Job Classifications As the Basis for an Implied Limitation on
Work Movement. - The "job classification list" is the list of the job classifica-
tions and their wage rates. Typically it is attached to the labor agreement as
an appendix. This list of rates establishes the hourly rates of pay for employees
who perform the work covered by each job classification if there is work in that
classification to perform. However, arbitrators have said that where such
classifications of work are listed, there is the "assumption that . . .work in
these categories . . . would be performed by those . . . covered by the agree-
ment,' 66 and thus, there is an implied agreement not to move work to sub-
contractors or other plants.
The award by Arbitrator John F. Sembower in Continental Can Go.6"
61 39 Lab. Arb. 449 (1962).
62 Id. at 455.
63 38 Lab. Arb. 619 (1962).
64 37 Lab. Arb. 928 (1962).
65 Id. at 933.
66 'Parke, Davis & Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 111, 115 (I. B. Scheiber, 1950).
67 29 Lab. Arb. 67 (1956). Other cases basing the restriction on the list of job classi-
fications are: Container Corp. of America, 37 Lab. Arb. 252 (H. T. Dworet, 1961); Mead
Paper Corp., 37 Lab. Arb. 342 (L. T. Hawley, 1961); U.S. Potash Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 442
(C. R. Schedler, 1961); Krey Packing Co., 32 Lab. Arb 68 (J. M. Klamon, 1959); Thomp-
son Grinder Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 671 (W. P. McCoy, 1956); East Texas Salt Water Disposal
Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 484 (C. Emery, 1953).
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is an example of the use of the "job classification list" as the basis for implying
a limitation on contracting out work.
The agreement is not silent on the matter of subcontracting. If it
does not speak out on it, it at least whispers when it spells out in
appendix A that janitors are included in the bargaining unit ...
When the Company specified job classifications in the recognition
of the bargaining unit, it in effect gives up its right to subcontract
in that field unless something is added in the way of a contract
provision giving the right to subcontract. .... 68 (Emphasis added)
Arbitrators such as V. L. Stouffer have rejected such a claim. In Columbus
Bolt & Forging Co. 6 9 Arbitrator Stouffer said:
[T]he list of job classifications contains nothing to indicate that
any particular number of jobs will be maintained or that all work
described in any particular classification will be done exclusively
by Employees of the Company.70
It is submitted that a mere list of job classifications should be construed
to be a list of the wage rates paid if certain work is performed, and not an
implied commitment that the management will not purchase goods or services
from others.
4. The Union Shop Clause As the Basis For An Implied Limitation on the
Right to Move Work. - In a two-to-one decision, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held in United Auto Workers v. Webster Electric Company"' that
a company could not, under its union shop contract with the UAW, contract
out the janitorial work previously done by three bargaining unit employees.
The majority opinion, noting that the contract contained no express prohibition
on contracting out, said:
But for the agreement, defendant rWebsterl would have that
right, [to subcontract] as an incident of management. However,
there is an agreement providing for a union shop. The employees
covered by that agreement are described as all defendant's em-
ployees, with certain irrelevant exceptions. This classification includes
the office janitorial employees. Thus they are required to be mem-
bers of plaintiff union. If they were to be excluded the agreement
should have said so .... If this small group can be thus replaced,
then other groups could meet the same fate, and eventually it
would be possible to deplete a major part of the "protected" union
shop force. We hold it would be inconsistent with the basic purpose
of the agreement to approve the contracting out of the janitorial
jobs here involved .
2
Judge Knoch, entered a strong dissent, stating in part:
The agreement between the union and management was the
result of collective bargaining. A long line of cases provided that
management had the right to contract out work unless that right
68 Continental Can Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 67, 73 (1956).
69 35 Lab. Arb. 397 (1960). To the same effect see Square D Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 892
(E. R. Teple, 1961); American Sugar Refining Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 334 (M. Beatty, 1961);
Black-Clawson Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 215 (E. R. Teple, 1960); Hertner Electric Co., 25 Lab.
Arb. 281 (S. S. Kates, 1955).
70 Columbus Bolt & Forging Co., 35 Lab. Arb. 397, 402 (1960).
71 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1961). See also Coulin v. Carey Cadillac Renting Co., 50
L.R.R.M. 2888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (Cashin, J. indicated agreement with Webster Electric
rationale) and Continental Can Co., 7 Basic Steel Arb. 4975 (M. H. Schmidt, 1959).
72 299 F.2d 195, 197 (7th Cir. 1961).
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was expressly limited by the terms of the agreement. The majority
hold that these cases have not been reversed by the ruling in Warrior.
Yet the majority would give the union the benefit of provisions
which it may, or may not have sought, but which, in any event,
it did not secure2a
The question of contract violation came before the court because the
labor agreement contained no arbitration clause. It is submitted that the view
that an agreement between a company and a union that new employees must
join the union also is an agreement between them that the company cannot
purchase goods or services from others comes as a complete surprise to com-
pany and union negotiators generally.
The view appears to be unique. No arbitration decision has been found
wherein a restriction on subcontracting work has been implied on this theory.
The opinion in Ashland Oil & Refining Co.,74 an award rendered years prior
to the Webster case, specifically rejected the argument. Arbitrator V. E. Ward-
law explained in that case that a union shop clause providing "that work
performed by employees as defined herein shall be by members of the union
S. ." means only that whenever an employee performs work covered by the
agreement, the employee shall belong to the union. Arbitrator R. Smith spe-
cifically rejected the Court's reasoning in Allis-Chalmers,75 saying:
Insofar as UAW v. Webster Electric Company, 299 F.2d 195,
held otherwise, the Referee, with deference, disagrees with the
conclusion there reached. The Court in that case predicated its
ruling on what it conceived to be the import of the "union shop"
provision of the labor agreement which was before it for considera-
tion. In the Referee's opinion, an absolute prohibition on con-
tracting out cannot properly be implied from such a provision.
Again it is submitted that a "union shop clause" cannot properly support
a restriction on subcontracting or work transfer between plants.
B. The Right to Move Work As A Reserved Managerial Right
Those arbitrators who refuse to imply restrictions apply basically a simple,
straightforward view to the effect that the management has reserved the right
to move work out of a bargaining unit, either to other plants or to subcontrac-
tors, unless by specific contractual language this right has been limited.7 They
refer to the "management clause" in a labor agreement which typically pro-
vides that the management reserves all managerial rights not specifically
73 Id. at 198.
74 8 Lab. Arb. 465 (1947).
75 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1213, 1217 (1962).
76 ACF Industries, 38 Lab. Arb. 14 (J. S. Williams, 1962); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
37 Lab. Arb. 944 (D. J. White, 1961); Harnishfeger Corp., 37 Lab. Arb. 685 (G. H. Young,
1961); Los Angeles Standard Rubber Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 784 (H. LeBaron, 1961); Beaunit
Mills, Inc., 37 Lab. Arb. 366 (H. T. Dworet, 1961); American Sugar Refining Co., 37 Lab.
Arb. 334 (M. Beatty, 1961); Rockwell-Standard Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 1447 (G. S. Bradley,
1961); Edward Balf Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1396 (J. F. Donnelly, 1961); Reynolds Metals Co.,
36 Lab. Arb. 1341 (H. Wycoff, 1961); Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 912 (M.
S. Ryder, 1961); Volunteer Electric Cooperative, 36 Lab. Arb. 787 (L. D. Redden, 1961);
Snyder Mining Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 861 (M. 0. Graff, 1961); West Virginia Pulp & Paper
Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 137 (B. C. Roberts, 1960); Columbus Bolt & Forging Co., 35 Lab. Arb.
397 (V. L. Stouffer, 1960); Richmond Baking Co., 30 Lab. Arb 493 (C. A. Warns, Jr.,
1957); American Airlines, Inc., 29 Lab. Arb. 594 (S. A. Wolff, 1957); Waller Bros. Stone
Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 704 (H. J. Dworkin, 1956); Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 27 Lab. Arb.
530 (J. M. Ylamon, 1956); American Airlines, Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. 174 (S. A. Wolff, 1956);
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limited (or bargained away) by some other provision of the agreement.7 7 Even
where no "management clause" is included, the view that the management
retains all rights to manage not specifically limited by a provision of the labor
agreement is still a controlling construction theory."
Those who so construe a labor agreement feel strongly that their brother
arbitrators are straying when they limit this normal managerial activity. Arbi-
trator M. Beatty, also a District Judge of Shawnee County, Kansas, expressed
his conviction that those arbitrators who imply restrictions on work movement
clauses are "in outer space and reading the stars instead of the contract." 9
In a more serious, but equally unsympathetic vein, Arbitrator P. M. Kelliher,
in Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Co.,"° noted:
It is a fundamental principle in the construction of Collective
Bargaining Agreements that Management continues to retain those
rights that it had prior to entrance into an effective Collective
Bargaining Contract. A careful analysis of the current Collective
Bargaining Agreement fails to disclose any language that can be
reasonably interpreted as indicating an intention of the Parties that
this Management thereby surrendered or limited its right to con-
tract out maintenance work. . . . This Arbitration Board simply
lacks the authority to, in effect, add an amendment to this Agree-
ment placing such a restriction upon the Company's rights.
Arbitrator Elmer E. Hilpert stated this position forthrightly when he
said: "
Admittedly, there is no provision in the agreement of these
parties (as there are provisions in the agreements of some other
parties) which expressly prohibits the Company from "contracting
out" so-called "unit" work; i.e., work which has been, traditionally,
historically, or characteristically, done by "unit" employees; and,
hence, the Union is compelled to contend that there is such an
implied prohibition on the Company's "contracting out" for such
work.
But it is axiomatic that, before a company enters into a col-
lective bargaining agreement, it possesses, as a mere incident of
its ownership of the business enterprise, inherent, plenary "man-
Stix, Baer & Fuller Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 57 (J. M. Klamon, 1956); Parke, Davis & Co., 26
Lab. Arb. 438 (R. W. Haughton, 1956).
77 The simple "reservation of rights" interpretation of the typical management clause
was well explained by Arbitrator P. Davis in Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 274,280 (1950) : In any company-employee relationship situation prior to the appear-
ance of a union and before the existence of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, every authority, power and responsibility in all aspects of manage-
ment is vested in the company and its authorized officials. The only restric-
tions upon the company in the area of labor-management relations arc
those imposed by federal, state or local legislative enactments, or ordinances.
Aside from such restrictions, the company is in complete possession of
all authority and power over its workers insofar as employment is con-
cerned. When a union is formed and a collective bargaining agreement is
signed, the original power and authority of the company is modified only
to the degree that it voluntarily and specifically relinquishes facets of its
power and authority. This principle is today firmly established in labor-
management relations and in arbitration.
To the same effect see Babcock & Wilcox Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 172 (S. S. Kates, 1956); United
Wallpaper, Inc., 25 Lab. Arb. 188 (J. F. Sembower, 1955).
78 Kay Mfg. Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 797 (M. Wersing, 1954).
79 American Sugar Refining Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 334, 338 (1961).
80 24 Lab. Arb. 158, 159 (1955).
81 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., Cases No. 13-14, '59-'62 (E. E. Hilpert, 1963).
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agerial powers," which include the power so to "contract out," and
that, after a company enters into a collective bargaining agreement,
it still retains all such of its formerly-existent inherent, plenary
managerial powers as were not proscribed, or restricted, in such
agreement. When it enters into a collective bargaining agreement,
a company, of course, "loses" such of its formerly-existent powers
as were expressly proscribed, or restricted, in such agreement; but
because it was the possessor of "inherent and plenary" powers, to
begin with, a company "loses" additional powers by implication
only if such implication is a "necessary" - in the sense of being an
"inescapable" - one. In sum, although there may be implied, as
well as express, limitations on a company's managerial powers in
a collective bargaining agreement, a rule of "strict construction" -
in "finding" such implied limitations- is to be applied.
No such implied limitation on the Company's power to "con-
tract out" may be derived from the "recognition" clause in the
parties' agreement ** * on which the Union herein principally
relies.
The fundamental invasion of the rights of management that is involved
in the creation of restrictions by implication was pointed out by Arbitrator
R. R. Williams in Hercules Powder Co., Ltd.: 2
Nowhere in the agreement is there to be found either expressly
or by implication, any restriction upon the right of the company
to have work covered by the job classifications performed by per-
sons who are not its employees. . . .A company's right to make
decisions affecting the management of its plant is founded in basic
and fully accepted tenets of the common law; while this right may
be contracted away or modified by agreement, it is not removed
by inference. The federal courts have recognized the law to be that,
where the agreement contains no ban upon such action, and where
the company's action is not discriminatory, contracting out is a
proper practice and right of management. Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949, 6th Circuit, 1947.
This simple construction has been followed many times by experienced arbitra-
tors and is reported to be the generally accepted view.8"
When courts have considered this matter they have supported the "re-
served rights" view. For example, in Local Union No. 600, UAW v. Ford
Motor Co.,8 4 the Federal District Court of Michigan refused to imply a re-
striction on work movement, saying:
The Court has before it, as a part of the pleadings, a copy
of the labor agreement which is the subject of this controversy. It
is obvious that it was a carefully and laboriously prepared docu-
ment, and that both the UAW-CIO and the Ford Motor Company
82 21 Lab. Arb. 330, 334 (1953).
83 E.g., in Los Angeles Standard Rubber Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 784, 786 (1961), Arbi-
trator H. LeBaron said:
The undersigned agrees with what appears to be the general holding
of arbitrators on this subject and that is that absent a specific prohibition
against subcontracting, management retains this right.
And Arbitrator T. G. Begley said in Reactive Metals, Inc. 62-2 ARB 8495 (1962):
The Arbitrator has read the arbitration decisions given to him by
the Union and the Company, and he finds that the weight of the deci-
sions as to subcontracting work is in favor of this Company -due to the
fact that the contract does not contain a specific provision prohibiting
the Company from contracting out unit work.
84 113 F. Supp. 834 (E. D. Mich. 1953).
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had the benefit of competent counsel and representatives in the
negotiations....
A reading of all the terms and conditions of this agreement
leaves one with the unshakable impression that its framers fully
intended to state clearly therein every point of importance in the
minds of the contracting parties, yet the plaintiffs [the union] wish
us to believe that there was a major area on a specific point, easily
includable in the written contract, but not so included. . . . It is
difficult to conceive of parties to a contract, who were as diligent
in its preparation as these parties, purposely omitting a vital con-
dition. The only possible conclusion that can be drawn is that such
condition did not in fact exist.85
Therefore, without a specific limitation on the right to transfer work, a
substantial number of contract interpreters hold, without equivocation, that
the management has the right to transfer work by subcontract or otherwise.
Such right to move work, they say, is one of the reserved rights.
C. The "Good Faith" or Middle-of-the-Road Approach
The theories of those who say work can be subcontracted or moved to
a new plant if the action was taken in good faith are the third group of theories.
Hidden behind the semantics of "good faith" and "bad faith" are actually
many variations in approach that need analysis.
Some arbitrators have held that the movement of work to a subcontractor
was in "bad faith" where the "subcontractor" is not in fact a separate employer,
but the original employer acting through a sham agent. Under established legal
concepts, the use of a sham arrangement to avoid statutory obligations has often
been stricken down. 6 A sham relationship designed to avoid contractual obliga-
tions should suffer the same fate. This principle was applied, in Continental Can
Co. Inc.,"7 where Arbitrator J. F. Sembower, reacting adversely to such an ar-
rangement, stated:
In scrutinizing subcontracting arrangements, arbitrators have
shown an inclination to inquire into whether certain arrangements
are, in fact, dealings with independent contractors or merely new
employer-employee relationships. It can hardly be gainsaid that
to come within the inherent rights of management it must be,
in fact, an independent contractual relationship, not employer-
employee.""
And in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.," a major factor in the apliroach of Arbitrator
85 Id. at 841-43.
86 See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (beef boners who
were paid by the hundredweight and called independent contractors, held to be "employees"
under FLSA); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947) (coal unloaders who were
called independent contractors, held "employees" under Social Security Act).
87 29 Lab. Arb. 67 (1956).
88 Id. at 72. Arbitrator W. P. McCoy said he joined those arbitrators who imply
restrictions on work movements in Thompson Grinder Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 671 (1956), but
the facts of that case showed that the so-called subcontractors were regular employees hired
as "independent contractors" over the weekends at lower rates to clean machinery -an
obvious sham arrangement. McCoy, however, did join those who restrict work movements
by implication in Pet Milk Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 278 (1959). Arbitrator Sidney A. Wolff
explained that the maintenance of the same direction of and control over cafeteria workers
after the subcontracting was a major consideration in striking down the arrangement in
Celanese Corp. of America, 14 Lab. Arb. 31 (1950), when he distinguished that decision in
American Airlines, Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. 174 (1956).
89 37 Lab. Arb. 944 (1961).
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D. J. White was the existence of a bona fide subcontracting relationship:
In any event, there is no question of lack of good faith in this
case. On the evidence it is clear that the Company's move was
a straight-forward affair; the subcontractor is bonafide, distinct
and at arm's length from Allis-Chalmers as a business entity90
Sham subcontracting situations involve an attempt to avoid contractual
obligations and can be clearly considered "bad faith." But when one leaves
this limited area, the semantics of "good faith"- "bad faith" lose all guide-
lines. Arbitrators are then in an uncharted sea. The tests used to determine
whether a managerial action was in "good faith" or not have varied so greatly
that, as Arbitrator Russell Smith observed, "the wide variation in the results
of their [the numerous arbitrators'] deliberations of itself casts some doubt
on the wisdom of such efforts .... ."1
Arbitrator Smith concluded that in general "'good faith' is present when
the managerial decision to contract out work is made on the basis of a rational
consideration of factors related to the conduct of an efficient, economical
operation, and with some regard for the interests and expectations of the
employees affected by the decision. . . ."' He then identified four instances
where a movement of work to a subcontractor should be stricken down as "bad
faith." 3
Without attempting anything like a complete "catalog," the
following would appear, at least prima facie, to be instances of
bad faith: (1) To negotiate a collective agreement with the Union
90 Id. at 950.
91 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1213, 1219 (1962).
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid. Arbitrator D. J. White, in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 944 (1961),
appears to say that Arbitrator Smith has in an earlier opinion also relied heavily on certain
contract construction principles as the test of "good faith." He said:
After reviewing at great length all of the opinions and decisions mentioned
by and submitted by the parties here, and after examining carefully Arbi-
trator Donald A. Crawford's landmark paper, "The Arbitration of Disputes
Over Subcontracting" and Arbitrator Mark L. Kahn's perceptive com-
ments thereon delivered at the 13th Annual Meeting of the National
Academy of Arbitrators, I am inclined to the view that the most realistic
and reasonable position is that which was expressed by Arbitrator Russell
A. Smith in Referee Case No. 8-1959-1961, Allis-Chalmers v. UAW, Local
1027, decided March 10, 1961. . . . Like Smith, I think we must first
address ourselves here to the evidence on past practice. (Footnotes omitted)
Where there is a language ambiguity in the labor agreement, past practice is often reviewed
by the arbitrators as an aid in determining the intention of the contracting parties. See
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1213, 1218 (1962). However, contract rights or
limitations are made by "agreement," not by "past practice." In this connection it is sig-
nificant that the contracting parties in Basic Steel in 1962 recorded in the "Memorandum
of Understandings on Miscellaneous Matters" that:
The Company has stated that it is its policy and intention to use its em-
ployees as much as practicable for work on the properties involved, and
to contract out work only when that course is required by sound business
considerations.
This statement would rebut any inference that the labor contract prevents subcontracting
and puts in doubt those awards construing the controversial Rule 2(B) as the source of
such contractual limitation. Bethlehem Steel Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 678 (R. Seward, 1958);
Republic Steel Corp., 32 Lab. Arb. 799 (H. Platt, 1959); Great Lakes Steel Corp., 8
Basic Steel Arb. 5481 (G. Alexander, 1959). In 1963 the 1962 statement on subcontracting
was replaced by a statement contained in the "Experimental Agreement" which essentially
limited subcontracting on work performed within the plant to the types which had been pre-
viously subcontracted. This agreement called forth a strong protest from the craft union
leaders who believed it constituted an attempt by the United Steelworkers to "monopolize"
work which should be performed by their members. Vol. XIIIII, No. 203 Wall Street Journal,
August 1, 1963.
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representative covering classifications of work while withholding
from the Union the fact that the employer contemplates, in the
immediate future, a major change in operations which will elimi-
nate such work; (2) entering into a "subcontracting" arrangement
which is a subterfuge, in the sense that the "employees" of the
ostensible "subcontractor" become in substance the employees of
the employer; (3) the commingling of employees of a subcon-
tractor, working under a different set of wages or other working
conditions, regularly and continuously with employees of the em-
ployer performing the same kinds of work; (4) contracting out
work for the specific purpose of undermining or weakening the
Union or depriving employees of employment opportunities.
His first test is related to the National Labor Relations Board's newly
defined obligation of an employer to notify the union of his intentions to con-
tract out work before taking action, first enunciated last year in the Town &
Country decision." The second and third tests are related to the sound legal
doctrine that an employer cannot avoid his contractual obligations by a "sham"
subcontract. 5 The fourth test is related to the "good faith" tests used by the
Board in runaway shop casess and quite recently in a case involving the move-
94 Town & Country Mfg. 'Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962). The Board said that the
subcontracting of work without advance notice to the union to provide it with an oppor-
tunity to negotiate with the employer was evidence, when evaluated as part of a pattern
of conduct, of a refusal to bargain in good faith required by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
To the extent that the work movement was an economic reprisal against employees exer-
cising protected rights, the Board's conclusion would be consistent with prior decisions
and it was on this basis that the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Board. However, there was
a statement in the nature of dictum in this case that the single act of failing to notify
the union of subcontracting before the decision is finalized will support a violation of
Section 8(a)(5). The same principle was first rejected by the Board in Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp., 130 NLRB 1558 (1961), and then, in a highly unusual reconsideration, 138
NLRB No. 68, 51 LRRM 1101 (1962), the Board reversed its decision and adopted the
Town & Country doctrine and this new decision was affirmed. Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp. v. NLRB, - F.2d - , 53 LRRM 2666 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Where a plant shut down
without advance notice to the union, the ruling was the same. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139
N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1962). In N.L.R.B. v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696 (lst Cir. 1962),
the court set aside a similar Board order, even where the shutdown occurred oniy shortly
after a union had become the representative of the employees, because economic reasons
existed for the shutdown. In N.L.R.B. v. Rapid Bindery Co., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961),
the court approved a finding requiring notification to the union after a decision to move the
plant had been made to allow bargaining on the effect of such decision. In NLRB v. Hawaii
Meat Co., Ltd.. ....... F.2d ........ 53 LRRM 2872 (2d Cir. 1963), the court reversed the Board,
holding that subcontracting without notice to the union during a strike was an action similar
to replacing an economic striker.
The new General Counsel of the Board, Arnold Ordman, invaded the labor contract
interpretation field when he wrote, as a Trial Examiner, an opinion finding an independent
8(a)(5) violation based on the provisions of Section 8(d). Adams Dairy 137 NLRB 815
(1962). This latter section includes the requirement that ". . . no party to [a] contract shall
terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification"
serves the requisite written notices and continues in full force and effect, without resorting
to strike or lockout, "the existing contract for a period of 60 days after such notice is given
or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later... , Mr. Ordman
found that:
By thus eliminating both the work which was the subject-matter of the
collective bargaining contract and the employees who performed that work,
Respondent in the most real sense terminated that contract since there was
no area left in which it could be operative. Without more, therefore, it
appears that Respondent's failure to follow the procedure prescribed by
Section 8(d) as a precondition to such termination constitutes a violation
of Section 8(a) (5). I so find.
95 See note 86, supra and accompanying text.
96 N.L.R.B. v. U.S. Air Conditioning Corp., 302 F.2d 824 (1st Cir. 1962); N.L.R.B.
v. Brown-Dunkin Co., Inc., 287 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1961); Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136
N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962); Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547 (1961).
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ment of work from one plant of an employer that was organized to another
that was not.9 7
It is submitted that Arbitrator Smith's second and third tests are sound,
but that the "good" or "bad" faith intentions of an employer in tests (1) and
(4) are established essentially by finding a violation of Section 8(a) (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act and hence should be matters solely within the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Arbitration should not be
the tribunal wherein one obtains remedies for violations of the National Labor
Relations Act. This view was expressed by the Federal District Court in
UAW v. Federal Pacific Co.:"
Since the contracts created no duty to continue operations, dam-
age to the employees and union from their termination was not
the result of illegal or tortuous conduct by defendant, and no right
of action exists founded either in tort or contract for the conse-
quences of the closing.
The only possible basis for relief to the employees or union
would appear to be on a showing that the closing was without
economic cause or justification or other cause except a purpose to
break the union, in some way prohibited as an unfair labor practice
under the Taft-Hartley Act. If the Act has created such rights in
plaintiffs, however, their vindication can be only through the
exclusive machinery set up by the Act, and not in the first instance
in this Court.
That the good faith and past practice tests applied by arbitrators in the sub-
contracting cases are leading arbitrators astray is the view of Arbitrator Elmer
Hilpert. He said: 99
One may question whether doctrines of (1) "bad faith" and of
(2) "past practice" are not associated with the presence or absence
of an interim "unfair labor practice," over which arbitrators have
no jurisdiction, rather than with the contractual scope of a com-
pany's residual "managerial powers," to which their jurisdiction is
confined....
Furthermore, a decision of an arbitrator concerning a matter covered by the
Act does not prevent the Board from rendering a contrary decision.'o
Undoubtedly, the introduction of the "good faith" qualification by arbi-
trators on the right of the employer to move work historically resulted from
a loose application of concepts developed by the National Labor Relations
Board. In one of the early "good faith" awards1 ' Arbitrator H. J. Dworkin
cited as his source an "American Law Report" as follows:
As a matter of law, the right of the company to subcontract
is clear. In recent years many courts have had occasion to pass
upon the question of the right of companies to subcontract work,
where a collective bargaining agreement exists. The decisions of
these courts are cited in an annotation on this subject appearing
in 57 A.L.R. 2d 1399 (1958). On the basis of court decisions on
97 Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1962).
98 36 L.R.R.M. 2357, 2358 (D. Neb. 1955).
99 Allis-Chalmers Co., Cases No. 13-14, '59-'62 (1963).
100 N.L.R.B. v. Wagner Iron Works, 220 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 981 (1956); N.L.R.B. v. Auto Workers, 194 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1952); Raytheon Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (1963).
101 Holub Iron & Steel Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 106 (1961).
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this subject, the general rule is stated in that annotation, at page
1400, as follows:
"It has been generally held, that, at least in the absence
of bad faith on the part of the employer, a collective labor
contract which contains no express prohibition against an
employer's hiring an independent contractor for the perform-
ance of work formerly done by employees covered by the
contract does not preclude the employer from hiring an
independent contractor to do such work."'1 2 [Emphasis added]
The ALR editors were discussing the "good faith" limitation on the right
to subcontract arising from the National Labor Relations Act rather than from
a labor agreement. These editors were correctly stating that when work is
removed by an employer in an effort to interfere with the employees' rights
to organize protected by the Act, the action violates an express prohibition con-
tained in the National Labor Relations Act.
°0 3
In enforcing the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board has followed the policy that
when business reasons for a transfer of work can be established by the employer,
the transfer of work cannot be found to be an act of interference. 0 4 It makes no
difference whether the employer's business reasons were, .in fact, sound or
foolish. In E-Z Mills, Inc.,' the company closed a plant in Vermont and
moved the operations to Georgia. The union claimed the purpose of the move
was to avoid dealing with it. The Board said:
The Respondent's contention that economic reasons motivated
the closing is supported by the testimony of its officials ...
Whether the Respondent's conclusions were correct, or were im-
provident folly, is immaterial if they were nondiscriminatory.'0 °
(Emphasis added.)
The Board and the Courts have clearly held that it is not their function
to substitute their judgment for that of an employer on such matters.'
However, the major group of arbitrators using the words "good faith"
as a test to be applied to the employer's motivation in moving work have other
things in mind than do the Board or the Courts when they find a work move-
ment to be in "bad faith."'0 8 Some consider movement of work to a sub-
102 Id. at 111.
103 See note 94 supra.
104 Currently there are contrary winds blowing at the Board. Arnold Ordman, the new
General Counsel, found interference with employee rights under 8(a) (3) of the Act arising
from work movements which were clearly motivated by sound business reasons in his trial
examiner opinion in Adams Dairy, 137 NLRB 815 (1962). He said (p. 826)
,... specific evidence of intent to encourage or discourage is not an in-
dispensable element of proof of violation of § 8(a) (3).' Such proof ...
is necessary 'where employer conduct inherently encourages or discourages
membership.'
105 106 N.L.R.B. 1039 (1953).
106 Id. at 1043. See also N.L.R.B. v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960); N.L.R.B.
v. R. C. Mahon Co., 269 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1959); N.L.R.B. v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226
F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955); Mount Hope Finishing Co., 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954);
Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954); Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., 106
N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
107 N.L.R.B. v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954). See
N.L.R.B. v. E. S. Kingsford, 313 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1963).
108 Approved Management Action as "Good Faith": Pure Oil Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 1042
(J. D. Larkin, 1962); Reynolds Metals Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 599 (J. F. Caraway, 1961);
Weyerhaeuser Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 308 (J. F. Sembower, 1961); Central Soya, 36 Lab. Arb.
1173 (J. F. Sembower, 1961); Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 912 (M. S. Ryder,
1961); American Sugar Refining Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 409 (D. A. Crawford, 1960) ("... . must
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contractor who pays his employees a lower wage or provides them less favorable
conditions a per se "bad faith" work movement. " This definition, undoubtedly,
springs from a desire to protect employees paid union wage scales from the
competition of others paid lower wage scales. Others consider work movements
may be approved as "good faith" only if no employee is on layoff at the time
it occurs or is not laid off as a result thereof."' These arbitrators are concerned
with the protection of work opportunities.
A substantial group of arbitrators have made efforts to catalogue the
definitions of "good" and "bad" faith. The lists become very extensive. For
example, Arbitrator J. F. Sembower, in Central Soya Co.,"' listed as the various
tests:
Many awards by outstanding arbitrators are grouped into cate-
gories which suggest to those authors that the question of "reason-
ableness" and "good faith" is determined in the light of "past
practice," "justification," "effect upon the union," "effect upon
unit employees," "type of work involved, i.e., whether it is work
demonstrate the existence of compelling logic or economies of operation and the consideration
of Union status and integrity of the bargaining unit." Id. at 414.); Holub Iron & Steel Co.,
36 Lab. Arb. 106 (H. Dworkin, 1961); International Paper Co., 35 Lab. Arb. 403 (A. R.
Marshall, H. L. Haynes, H. W. Wissner, 1960); Black-Clawson Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 215 (E. R.
Teple, 1960); United States Steel Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 282 (S. Garret, 1959); Reynolds Metals
Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 815 (C. W. Anrod, 1959); Republic Steel Corp., 32 Lab. Arb. 799 (H. H.
Platt, 1959); Haven Busch Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 781 (J. H. Piercey, 1959); White Brothers,
32 Lab. Arb. 965 (J. A. Hogan, 1958); Weatherhead Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 1066 (H. Dworkin,
1958); Bendix Aviation Corp., 30 Lab. Arb. 827 (M. H. Schmidt, 1958); Texas Gas
Transmission Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 413 (P. M. Hebert, 1956); Tempco Aircraft Corp., 27
Lab. Arb. 233 (L. V. Larson, 1956); Cannon Electric Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 870 (B. Aaron,
1956); International Harvester Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 1 (R. Smith, 1955); Devoe & Raynolds,
22 Lab. Arb. 608 (A. R. Porter, 1954); Koppers Co., Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 124 (M. Reid,
1954). Disapproved Management Action: Gulf Oil Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. 852 (D. A. Crow-
ford, 1959); General Metals Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. 118 (M. Lennard, 1955); Niagara Veld-
ments, Inc., 63-1 ARB 8062 (J. Shister, 1962). In Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 39 Lab. Arb.
1213 (R. A. Smith, 1962), Arbitrator Smith said:
The Referee has examined (more than once) the reported cases, as
have others. His distinct impression is that in most instances, at least in
recent years, the result in the particular case was to uphold the employer's
right to take the protested action, while the opinion indicated the view
that there are limitations based on factors not presented by the facts of
the particular case. For example, an examination of all the subcontracting
cases reported in volumes 35, 36, and 37 of Labor Arbitration Reports (the
last three such volumes) revealed 22 decisions denying the specific grievance
against subcontracting and only six upholding the specific grievances.
39 Lab. Arb. at 12.
109 Gulf Oil Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. 852 (D. A. Crawford, 1959); White Bros., 32 Lab.
Arb. 965 (J. A. Hogan, 1958). In the White Bros. case, Arbitrator Hogan said:
The distinction between lower-cost subcontracting where the lower
costs are based on greater efficiency and subcontracting where the lower
costs are based on lower wage rates, few fringe benefits or less favorable
working conditions, is of prime importance because it helps resolve the
fundamental problem. The fundamental problem in subcontracting cases is
how to secure a fair accommodation between Management's right to run its
business efficiently and the Union's right to protect its bargained standards.
Id. at 969.
See also Thriftmart Inc., 84 Daily Labor Report: D-1 (1963) (F. Meyers).
110 Reynolds Metals Corp., 37 Lab. Arb. 599 (J. F. Caraway, 1961); Tempco Aircraft
Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 233 (L. V. Lennart, 1956).
111 36 Lab. Arb. 1173, 1176 (1961). In General Metals Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. 118 (1955)
Arbitrator M. Lennard sets forth eleven tests to be used to determine whether the manage-
ment moved the work in "good faith" or not. In Crawford, The Arbitration of Disputes
Over Subcontracting in CHALLENGES TO ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13 TH ANNUAL
MEETING OF NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 51 (1960), the author attempted to
catalogue various tests. Harry Shulman encouraged the "good faith" approach in his Oliver
Wendell Holmes Lecture, Feb. 9, 1955, Harvard Law School published in National Academy
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which normally is done by unit employees," "availability of prop-
erly qualified employees, .... availability of equipment and facilities,"
"regularity of subcontracting," "duration of subcontracted work,"
"unusual circumstances involved," and "history of negotiations on
the right to subcontract."
There is another group of arbitrators who, although using the words
"good faith," apparently believe that they should not block a normal manage-
ment action. They approve any work movement if they find it an act moti-
vated by a desire to lower costs and increase efficiency. For example, in Inter-
national Paper Company,"' Arbitrator A. R. Marshall said "there is persuasive
evidence that the Company has acted in good faith" because it "contracted
out work in an attempt to operate the mill in an efficient manner." '113 In Bethle-
hem Steel Co.,"' Arbitrator R. Seward cited with approval the principle that
the question of whether the action is in good faith is whether the company's
action can be justified as "a normal and reasonable management action.""' 5
In National Tube Co.,"6 Arbitrator S. Garrett said the test was whether the
employer's action "can be justified. . . as a normal and reasonable management
action. .. "
Most arbitrators who evaluate work movements in terms of "good faith"
are probing the motivation of management. Arbitrator H. W. Wissner, in
Ideal Cement Co.,"' said subcontracting disputes "ultimately are reduced to
a crucial point of Company judgment." That some arbitrators quite frankly
recognize that the "good faith" test in work movement cases has led them into
a review of the wisdom of a managerial decision and that they are in fact
substituting their judgment for that of the management is interesting. Arbi-
trator M. Lennard in General Metals Corp."8 said:
If this appears to be a substitution of my judgment for that
of the management, the risk of such a substitution is inherent in
a dispute like this one where the arbitrator is required to weigh
the legitimate objective of the management (to run a cleaner,
better, more efficient business) against the legitimate objective of
the union (to protect the job security of its members). This is
markedly true where the contract of the parties as in this case,
defines only in the most general terms the permissible methods of
achieving both objectives." 9
of Arbitrators Proceedings BNA 1956. M. Beatty made this pointed criticism of this approach
in American Sugar Refining Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 334 (1961):
When an arbitrator finds that the parties have not dealt with the subject
of contracting-out in their working agreement, but that the employer is
nevertheless prohibited from contracting-out (a) unless he acts in good
faith; (b) unless he acts in conformance with past practice; (c) unless he
acts reasonably; (d) unless his act does not deprive a substantial number
of employees of employment; (e) unless his acts were dictated by the
requirements of the business; (f) if his act is barred by the recognition
clause; (g) if his act is barred by the seniority provisions of the working
agreement; or (h) if his act violates the spirit of the agreement, the
arbitrator may be in outer space and reading the stars instead of the
contract. (Footnotes omitted.) 37 Lab. Arb. at 337.
112 35 Lab. Arb. 403 (1960).
113 Id. at 408.
114 30 Lab. Arb. 678 (1958).
115 Id. at 683.
116 17 Lab. Arb. 790, 794 (1951).
117 39 Lab. Arb. 349, 351 (1962).
118 25 Lab. Arb. 118 (1955).
119 Id. at 122.
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As soon as "motives," "reasonableness" and "necessity" become the criteria,
the arbitrator ceases to be an interpreter of an agreement, and becomes a judge
of the merits of a business decision. It was early recognized that management
decisions were properly the affair of managements, not arbitrators, in this apt
statement from Wright Aeronautical Corp.: 2 o
[lit is management which is responsible for results. This being
so, the management should be free to manage. To permit compul-
sory arbitration in matters affecting the business policies... would,
in effect, force upon management judgments of persons chosen as
arbitrators who may know little or nothing about the business and
plant problems involved and who bear no personal responsibility
for the consequences of their awards. The operation of a great
industrial plant like the Wright plant... is a task which can be
performed only by men familiar with its organization and skilled
in the work that is done. Tampering with the machine by un-
skilled hands would be a dangerous procedure and is not to be
encouraged. (Emphasis added.)
That the "good faith" -"bad faith" approach requires the arbitrator to
substitute his judgment for that of the management rather than an interpreta-
tion of the agreement was pungently pointed up by Arbitrator M. Beatty:".
Arbitrators are not soothsayers and "wise men" employed to
dispense equity, and good will according to their own notions of
what is best for the parties, nor are they kings like Solomon with
unlimited wisdom or courts of unlimited jurisdiction. Arbitrators
are employed to interpret the working agreement as the parties
themselves wrote it.
II
THE POSSIBLE CONFLICTS BETWEEN IMPLIED RESTRICTIONS
ON WORK MOVEMENTS AND OTHER LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC DOCTRINES
A. The Illegality of Limitations On Freedom to Subcontract Under
Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act
In 1959, Section 8(e) was added to the National Labor Relations Act.
It reads as follows: 22
(e) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organi-
zation and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement,
express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or
agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting
120 13 L.R.R.M. 2580, 2582 (1943) (arbitrator not indicated). See also United Dairy
Workers v. Detroit Creamery Co., 38 L.R.R.M. 2303 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne Co., 1956).
121 American Sugar Refining Co., 61-3 ARB 8773 (1961). Arbitrator W. P. McCoy
was critical of the "good faith" test for an opposite reason. He said, in Pet Milk Co., 33
Lab. Arb. 278 (1959), it created a way by which subcontracting could be approved:
Later decisions disclose that employers, . . . have contracted out work that
the parties did have in mind when they negotiated their collective bar-
gaining contracts. In many such cases arbitrators have denied a company's
right to so "fracture the bargaining unit." The real basis of these decisions
is not "bad faith," as so often asserted, but the nature of the work. A
company and union do not bargain for wages, hours, overtime, etc., in a
vacuum. They bargain for the performance of certain work, and set the
terms for such performance. If, having set those terms, the Company can
avoid compliance by the simple device of contracting, the entire contract
could become a nullity.... 33 Lab. Arb. at 279.
122 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. IV, 1958).
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or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer,
or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract
or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such
an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void....
(Emphasis added)
Since this language makes it an unfair practice to enter into an express or
implied agreement preventing the employer from doing business with other
employers, one would think it would make the actions of arbitrators and courts
which imply such restrictions illegal.
In this connection it should be noted that Section 8(e) also contains
provisos expressly permitting agreements restricting employers in their dealings
with subcontractors in the construction and clothing industries. 2 ' These express
exceptions, of course, make the conclusion that in those industries not covered
by the exceptions, a restriction on a movement of work to a subcontractor
would be outlawed.
However, some have argued that its broad language prohibiting agree-
ments which obligate an employer to cease doing business with any other person
does not make unlawful express or implied provisions in labor contracts that
restrict or limit a management's right to "contract" and "do business" with
another employer or use the products produced or services rendered by that
other employer unless such restriction is in the nature of a secondary boycott.
This means that to violate Section 8(e), the express or implied restriction on
subcontracting must have been borne in an attempt to harm the subcontractor
because he does not pay union wages, [he does not] have a contract with the
union, or for some other reason.12 But a reading of the legislative history of the
section establishes that its leading proponents and opponents interpreted Section
123 Locals 234 and 243, International Ladies Garment Workers v. Beauty Bilt Lingerie,
48 L.R.R.M. 2995 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The arguments that the apparel and construction
industry exceptions made the 8(e) limitation on subcontracting unconstitutional as an
irrational classification and violative of due process clause of Fifth Amendment were rejected
in Employing Lithographers v. N.L.R.B., 301 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1962).
124 Previant, The Hot Cargo and Secondary Boycott Sections: A Critical Analysis, 48
GEo. L. J. 346 (1959). See also Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the N.L.R.A., 44
MINN. L. Rlv. 257 (1959) at page 273:
Although the language leaves doubt, the underlying rationale should also
exclude from section 8(e) conventional restrictions upon subcontracting
such as the promise that
"all work that is usually performed in the plants of the Company
shall continue to be performed in such plants unless a change
is mutually agreed upon by both parties."
In a literal sense this clause is an agreement between an employer and
a union by which the employer undertakes not to do business with any
other person, but it has a different function from the contracts which
were the targets of section 8(e). A restriction upon subcontracting which
seeks to protect the wages and job opportunities of the employees covered
by the contract, by forbidding the employer from having certain kinds of
business done outside his own shop, is quite different in purpose and
effect from blacklisting specified employers or groups of employers because
their products or labor policies are objectionable to the union. The fact
that Congress rejected the attacks upon the secondary boycott provisions
of the Landrum-Griffin bill which alleged that the bill unwisely threw
doubt upon the validity of bona fide restrictions upon subcontracting, may be
attributed to disbelief in the allegation just as easily as to congressional
opposition to contractual restrictions upon managerial freedom to sub-
contract, although there were undoubtedly individuals who hoped to
resolve the subcontracting issue in favor of management. Whatever the
merits of the latter issue, it is distinct from the only explicit subject of
legislative concern.
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8 (e) as a provision which would prohibit agreements, express or implied, prohib-
iting "contracting out" of work where the motivation behind the restriction was
merely keeping the work in the "home" plant rather than to injure the out-
sider.
125
For example, during the journey of the Landrum-Griffin Act from the
House floor into Congressional conference and then to eventual passage, and
as part of an unsuccessful effort to change the language of Section 8(e), Sena-
tor Kennedy and Congressman Thompson of New Jersey prepared a joint
critique 2 ' which said:
Companies and unions in manufacturing industries often agree
upon restrictions upon subcontracting in order to protect the em-
ployees against the loss of jobs .... It would not be unusual for a
power company to agree not to contract out any of its line con-
struction while its own regular employees worked less than 40 hours
a week. These clauses are frequently negotiated in all kinds of
industry. They have nothing to do with hot cargo agreements
or secondary boycotts. Yet they appear to be outlawed by the
House bill.
The language of the House bill should be revised to avoid this
interference with normal collective bargaining. (Emphasis added)
These remarks by Senator Kennedy and Representative Thompson are
significant. Both believed that the language of Section 8(e) would effectively
outlaw clauses in labor agreements preventing an employer from subcontracting
regardless of the motivation behind the restriction. Except for the garment
and construction industry provisos, Section 8(e), as finally passed, is identical
to the provision Kennedy and Thompson were discussing.'
Senator Morse similarly interpreted Section 8(e). He also explained that
this provision would prohibit an employer from agreeing not to subcontract
work: 128
The House bill, and now the conference report, have made it
an unfair labor practice for any employer and a union to include
in their agreement a provision which imposes any condition upon
doing business with another employer....
The far-reaching effect of this proposal is something on which
there are no hearings. The conferees, and certainly no member of
this body, have any idea how many labor agreements contain such
provisions. Examples that come to my mind which would be banned
by these provisions are as follows:
First. It would prevent a union from protecting the bargaining
125 Senators Kennedy, Morse, McNamara and Randolph, and Representative Thompson,
made unsuccessful efforts to change the language so as to avoid this result. I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, 944; II Id.
1383, 1700, 1708.
126 105 CONG. REG. 16590 (1959). See also the following quotation from the Kennedy
and Thompson critique to the same import:
Section 707 of the Senate bill sought to correct this by outlawing hot
cargo clauses and making existing clauses unenforceable. The bill also
makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to request such a clause in
collective bargaining.
The House bill extends these prohibitions to all employers and labor unions.
The objection to extending the "hot cargo" limitation into a general
prohibition such as the House bill contains is that the general prohibition
would also outlaw legitimate forms of collective agreement. Ibid.
127 Compare H.R. 8400 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 705(b)(1) with § 704(b) of the
Landrum-Griffin Act, i.e., 8(e) of the N.L.R.A.
128 See 105 Cong. Rec. 17884 (1959).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
unit it represents by obtaining an agreement not to subcontract
work normally performed by employees in the unit. (Emphasis
added)
The addition of the garment and construction industry provisos to Section
8(e) after the unsuccessful attempts by Senators Kennedy, McNamara, Ran-
dolph and Morse and Representative Thompson to change the language, lends
additional support to the view that this section makes an agreement not to
subcontract an unfair labor practice. The garment industry proviso states that
"The term 'any employer' . . . shall not include persons in the relation of a
. . . subcontractor . . . in the apparel and clothing industry." '129 Thus, Con-
gress took pains to provide specifically that Section 8(e) did not prohibit an
agreement between an employer and a union that the employer would cease
doing business with a "subcontractor" in the garment industry. Therefore, it
can certainly be argued that Congress intended Section 8(e) to outlaw all
agreements, express or implied, preventing subcontracting by the employer,
unless protected by such a proviso. In other words, there would be no need
to exempt garment industry employers and subcontractors from protection
from such restrictive clauses unless the language, without the exemption, would
have made restrictions on the movement of work to such subcontractors illegal.
In District No. 9, IAM,"0 the Board held that a contract clause prohibit-
ing subcontracting except to shops or subcontractors approved by the uniorf
violated Section 8 (e). The clause read:. 3 '
Whenever the employer finds it feasible to send work out that
comes under the jurisdiction of the union and this contract, pref-
erence must be given to shop or subcontractors approved or having
contracts with District No. 9, International Association of Ma-
chinists. (Article XXIX)
The Board stated: 1
32
The very language of Section 8(e) which proscribes the "en-
tering into" of contracts or agreements, express or implied, is broad
and sweeping in scope. The term "enter into" at law means "to
join with another or with others" or "to become bound or obligated
by a . . .contract." Even though Article XXIX was void and a
nullity in the eyes of the law, the parties agreed that "Article XXIX
was binding on all members of the car dealers' association." The
parties maintained, reaffirmed and gave effect to Article XXIX
thereby becoming bound by it. Accordingly, we find, in agreement
with the General Counsel, that the respondent and the car dealers'
association did "enter into" an agreement on November 2, 1960,
which incorporated Article XXIX and by so doing violated Section
8(e) of the Act. (Footnotes omitted.)
In Local 618, IBT,"' the Board held that a similar clause violated Section
8(e).
Most recently the Board held in the Pure Milk Association case.3 . that
a union's attempt to enforce an agreement with the employer whereby the
129 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. IV, 1958).
130 134 N.L.R.B. 1354 (1961). See also Minnesota Milk Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1314 (1961).
131 District No. 9, IAM, 134 N.L.R.B. 1354, 1356 (1961).
132 Id. at 1359.
133 134 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1961). See also Alpert v. Local 559 Teamsters, 49 L.R.R.M.
2802 (D. Conn. 1962).
134 Pure Milk Ass'n, 141 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1963).
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employer agreed not to do business with any other employer who did not hire
union drivers violated Section 8(e). In connection with shipments of milk
from its dairy, the Sidney Wanzer Company had changed from a contractor
who hired union drivers to a contractor who did not. The union struck. Its
action was enjoined by a federal court pending the decision by the Board that
the attempted enforcement of the clause restricting subcontracting violated
Section 8(e).
One commentator, Emanuel Dannett.5  recognized the scope of the
language of 8(e) and its unique legislative history:
The language of Section 8(e), if read literally, bars all collec-
tive bargaining agreements in which an employer agrees to cease
"doing business with any other person." It would thus condemn
all of the no-subcontracting provisions, whether or not a neutral
party would be affected by the provision. 3
Significantly he pointed out that some of the legislators who urged the
broad language finally adopted in 8(e) were cognizant of the public policy
against restraints on trade:
[T]here is a substantial body of opinion to the effect that
clauses [in labor agreements] barring the use of prefabricated prod-
ucts are against public policy because they frequently operate to
prevent the use of technological improvements, to encourage make-
work arrangements, or to compel the employer to continue un-
economic practices. Congressman Rhodes was of the opinion that
such clauses would be held to be "flagrant restraints of trade;"
were it not for the exemption given to labor unions under the anti-'
trust acts. The public policy considerations opposing prefabrica-
tion clauses would apply with equal force to conventional no-sub-
contracting clauses. 3 7 (Emphasis added)
The impact of Section 8(e) on union claims that contracting out is re-
stricted by the labor agreement has rarely been discussed by arbitrators.'
This may result from the fact that management advocates appearing before
135 Dannett, The Legality of Subcontracting Provisions Under Section 8(e), in SYM-
POSIUM oN LMRDA, LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 905
(1961). See to the same effect Farmer, The Status and Application of Secondary
Boycott and Hot Cargo Provisions, 48 GEo. L. J. 327, 335-40 (1959); Fairweather, An
Evaluation of the Changes in Taft-Hartley, 54 Nw. U. L. REv., 711, 726-733 (1960); cf.
Rothman, Problems Raised by New Secondary Boycott Provisions, 45 L.R.R.M. 78 (1959).
136 Dannett, supra note 134, at 905.
137 Id. at 910.
138 Arbitrator J. M. Klamon in Selb Mfg. 'Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 834 (1961), enforced what
appears to be an illegal clause. It stated:
The Companies will not, so long as equipment and personnel are available,
subcontract work which is customarily performed by employees in the bar-
gaining unit to any other company. When necessary to subcontract work,
every effort shall be made to give the work to a contractor who employs
members of the International Association of Machinists. 37 Lab. Arb. at
837.
Arbitrator Klamon answered the Company's argument as to the legality of the clause:
Since both parties have incorporated this Article into agreements between
them for some years, we certainly have no authority either to assume that
anyone acted in bad faith, nor do we have the authority to usurp the
function of the courts in this matter. In the absence of a clear holding
that such an Article is illegal by our highest courts, we must as Arbi-
trators interpret and apply the meaning and intent of the agreement
and not presume to guess relative to legality...
This case was enforced by the U. S. District Court, IAM v. Selb Mfg. Co., 49 L.R.R.M.
2366 (E.D.Mo. 1961). Interestingly, the Court did not rest its affirmance on a violation
of this contract clause but found by implication a violation of the seniority clause. Another
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them have not pointed out its language and clear legislative history. However,
where a contract clause is illegal it becomes null and void and should not be
enforced by an arbitrator.1 39 Section 8(e) should certainly not be ignored.
Arbitrators should exercise great care to avoid incorporating by implication
an illegal restriction upon dealing with subcontractors into a labor agreement.
B. Are Union-Employer Agreements Restricting "Work Movements"
Illegal Under the Antitrust Acts?
As has been noted, work movements to an outside contractor occur because
he is a specialist and costs can thereby be reduced. Similarly, work movements
to other plants of the same company result from cost dictates (transportation,
efficiency of method, lower wage costs, etc.). Competition is the regulating
force that causes the "make or buy" analysis to be made and governs the
transfer of work to obtain cost reductions. This regulatory rule of competition
is recognized by the law. "The heart of our national economic policy long has
been faith in the value of competition"14 because a "free economy best pro-
motes the public weal. . . ."' The Sherman Act implemented this national
economic policy and the Supreme Court said it proscribed "all combinations
and conspiracies which restrain the free and natural flow of trade in the
channels of interstate commerce."42 (Emphasis added)
Quite obviously an agreement (either express or implied) between an
employer and a labor union that the employer will not subcontract work to
others is an agreement to restrict the flow of work to a lower cost producer
of certain goods or supplier of certain services. The effect of such an agree-
ment is to hold the work at the higher cost location against the economic
forces of price competition. Since such an agreement results in higher costs
example of an apparent disregard of Section 8(e) is Arbitrator James J. Healy's decision in
Narragansett Brewing Co. and Brewery Workers Local 114, 61-2 ARB 8495. The union
contract provided:
Only union-made malt shall be used if the same is obtainable. All other
union-made material and supplies shall be given preference provided
price, quality, and general conditions are equal.
To meet competition the company had changed beer carton sizes and a rush order was sent
to an outside supplier. Upon discovery that the cartons were not union made, the union
filed a grievance alleging violation of the contract. Without considering the legality of the
clause, Arbitrator Healy directed the company to make reasonable investigation in the future
to insure that goods purchased were union made. See also ILGWU v. Beauty Bilt Lingerie,
48 L.R.R.M. 2995 (S.D. N.Y. 1961).
139 To refuse to enforce an illegal clause is not an action that is subject to the criticism
that the arbitrator is enforcing specific provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. In
other situations arbitrators have refused to uphold illegal contracts. See United Tavern, 16
Lab. Arb. 210 (M. Slavney, 1951) (union shop clause violated state law); Hillside Transit
Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 470 (A. Anderson, 1954) where the arbitrator said:
I am persuaded that I do not have authority to knowingly make a decision
which is in direct conflict with statutes and court decisions dealing with
the same subject. . . . In my opinion, the seniority provision of the agree-
ment in question is in conflict with the Labor Management Relations Act
as interpreted by the two highest authorities on that law and, therefore,
invalid. . . .22 Lab. Arb. at 473.
See also Mode O'Day Corp., 1 Lab. Arb. 490 (G. Cheney, 1946) (states that any
conflict between Selective Service Act and c6ntract must be resolved in favor of Act).
140 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951).
141 Times Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953); see also
Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
142 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609
(1914).
IMPLIED RESTRICTIONS ON WORK MOVEMENTS
it will hold prices up and the consumer will be injured. On this analysis, agree-
ments, either express or implied, prohibiting subcontracting should be stricken
down as violative of the national policy enunciated in the Sherman Act.
However, alongside the national policy designed to preserve competition,
there sits another. This is a policy to preserve for labor unions certain powers
which, when exercised, may restrain trade. In theory, unions will use these
powers to better the conditions of their members and it is believed that the
benefits derived by the members justify the restraints on trade.
To determine how these two policies should be reconciled when they come
into conflict, Congress enacted Section 20 of the Clayton Act.'43 This licensed
unions to exercise their power "lawfully" in carrying out "legitimate objects."
This legislative pronouncement did not resolve the conflict in these opposing
policies. The questions of what was a "lawful" exercise of the union's power
to restrain commerce and what was a "legitimate object" to be obtained by
the exercise of such power became the subjects of much litigation. It was not
until the Norris-LaGuardia Act'" denied the federal courts the use of injunc-
tive remedies where a restraint of trade arose out of a labor dispute 45 and the
Congressional intent was re-evaluated by the cour' 4 6 that labor union actions
which restrained trade gained real immunity from the proscriptions of the
antitrust laws. This shield that protected unions from liability for restraints
of trade was based on an interpolation of the Clayton Act and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. Justice Frankfurter in U. S. v. Hutcheson4 7 explained:
[W]hether trade union conduct constitutes a violation of the
Sherman Law is to be determined only by reading the Sherman
Law and § 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act
as a harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct.
For the Norris-LaGuardia Act portion of this "Clayton-Norris-LaGuardia-
Hutcheson shield" to apply, the restraint of trade had to occur in connection
with a labor dispute. This was made clear in the Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 48 where it stated that
a commercial restraint created by a labor union is vulnerable under the Sherman
Act unless the restraint occurs "in the course of a labor dispute as defined in
143 The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations,
instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or
conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects 'thereof;
nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed
to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws. (Emphasis added) Clayton Act § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 17 (1958).
144 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
145 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 13(c), 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1958)
provides:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
146 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
147 Id. at 231.
148 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWs, 299-330 (1955)
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the Norris-LaGuardia Act." This means that before this portion of the "shield"
will protect a contractual restraint upon an employer doing business with a
subcontractor the restraint must be a secondary boycott attack upon the sub-
contractor. Otherwise it becomes a restraint that does not grow out of a dis-
pute between the union and the subcontractor.
Now any restraint on dealing with a subcontractor which is in the nature
of a secondary boycott - for example, an attack upon the subcontractor because
he is unorganized or fails to pay union scale -is clearly illegal under Section
8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act. Therefore, if the restraint has a
secondary boycott objective, i.e., an attack against the subcontractor, it cannot
any longer be a restraint for a "legitimate objective" and the Clayton Act
part of the shield falls.'49
Conversely, if the restraint is not a secondary boycott attack upon the sub-
contractor, then it is not a restraint growing out of a labor dispute, but is simply
an agreement between a union and an employer to impose a commercial restraint
upon the purchasing of products or services. As such, it is not protected under the
portion of the shield which is built upon the Norris-LaGuardia Act.15
The relationship between a prohibition in a labor contract against an
employer dealing with another employer and the policy against restrictions on
trade underlying the Sherman Act was recognized by Solicitor General Archi-'
bald Cox:...
Apart from the participation of the labor union, [hot cargo]
agreements would violate the Sherman Act. [Fashion Originators
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)] This was the theory upon
which the Senate voted to outlaw "hot cargo" contracts in the truck-
ing industry. In the House the prohibition was expanded to all
agreements by which an employer agrees with a labor organization
not to handle or use the goods of another person....
In addition, the Attorney General's report states that where a "union combines
with a nonlabor group to effect some direct commercial restraint" the anti-
trust laws remain applicable and impose liability upon the union and the con-
spiring nonlabor group." 2 A contractual restraint on subcontracting is, of
course, pursuant to an agreement between a union and a nonunion employer.
Hence, under this view, which reflects the actions of the federal courts, such
a restraint would clearly appear to violate the antitrust laws.
The leading decision of the Supreme Court to the effect that a union
149 In United States v. Fish Smokers Trade Council, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 227, 236
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), it was stated:
The Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, raised as a shield by defendants
for their otherwise unlawful activities, cannot avail them here. By their
very language, these Acts are limited to the pursuit of legitimate objects
of labor and labor disputes affecting the employer-employee relationship
for the purpose of mutual help, which language encompasses neither dis-
putes over the sales of commodities nor employer help in controlling
market and price. (Emphasis added)
150 A restraint suppressing commercial competition is not protected activity. Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 501 (1940) (Dictum).
151 Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44
MINN. L. REv. 257, 272 (1959).
152 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST L.WS, 299-330 (1955).
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cannot establish a commercial restraint on trade by agreement with a nonunion
group is Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3.153 In that case a labor union
had aided a group of employers to create a monopoly to control the marketing
of goods and services. It was held to be a violation of the Sherman Act, not-
withstanding the fact that the union's actions were intended to further its mem-
bers' interests as wage earners. Very recently the Supreme Court restated the
holding of the Allen Bradley54 case saying:
It is also beyond question that nothing in the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, nor in the labor exemption
provisions of the Clayton Act, insulate a combination in illegal
restraint of trade between businessmen and a labor union from
the sanctions of the anti-trust laws.
The District Court in Minnesota in United States v. Milk Drivers Union,'55
found that a union had violated the antitrust acts when it entered into an agree-
ment with certain dairies which contained a provision that "gave the Union
the right to discontinue delivery to stores that sold milk at 'unfair' prices-
that is consumer prices which were substantially below the prices charged by
the dairies for home deliveries." Although this was not an agreement between
a company and a union wherein the company agrees not to deal with the out-
sider, the net effect of this company-union agreement was the same.
The Court explained the union's claim for exemption from the Antitrust
Act as follows: 5
The Union claims that it is immune from the issuance of an
injunction because its conduct in this case in attempting to equalize
or minimize the differential between the prices at which milk was
sold at stores and at the home, was for the welfare of its members,
and was a labor dispute.
We need not decide here whether the Union, acting alone, in
what it did was in a "labor dispute" within the immunization clause
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act because complaint is made against,
and relief is sought from, the Union's acting, not alone, but in
combination with milk producers, stores and others in a conspiracy
to fix the price of milk. So the legal question is whether such
conduct, if proved, is enjoinable. The answer is yes and the
authority is contained in the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, 1945, 325 U.S. 797, 65 S. Ct. 1533,
89 L. Ed. 1939.
That case enunciated the principle that a union operates out-
side the scope of its statutory immunity when it combines with a
non-labor group to impose commercial restrictions such as price-
fixing on interstate trade and commerce, even though it be prompted
by a desire to further its own interests and that of its wage-earner
members.
It was thought by some that the majority of the Court in the Allen Bradley
case had only outlawed restrictive agreements between a union and a group
of employers and that restrictive agreements made by a union and a single
153 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
154 Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962).
155 153 F. Supp. 803 (D.Minn. 1957).
156 Id. at 808.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
employer were exempted by the "shield."15 However, the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York in three cases was not bothered
by the fact that only one employer was involved. It held that agreements
between a single employer and a union restricting the employer to business
dealings with certain subcontractors violated the Sherman Act. The effect of
these agreements is very similar to the limitation on the subcontracting of work
implied by arbitrators.
In Loews, Inc. v. Basson,158 a union of projectionists, deliverers and cutters
sought to compel a movie producer-distributor to license only exhibitors who
employed union projectionists. Even though the producer-distributor objected,
the court held that its entry into the proposed contract constituted an illegal
combination between a union and a nonlabor group. It was also held that the
restraint did not arise from a labor dispute and for this additional reason was
not protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
In Westlab, Inc. v. Freedomland, Inc.,'59 the defendant, Freedomland, had
entered into a contract with the plaintiff, Westlab, providing that Westlab would
design, engineer and supply all sound equipment for a recreation park. Subse-
quent to the consummation of this contract, defendant union, Local 3, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, informed Freedomland that its mem-
bers would not perform any work at the park if Westlab, the subcontractor, was
permitted to supply material for the project, because Westlab did not employ
members of Local 3. Thereafter Freedomland entered into a subcontract with
Sound Systems, Inc., a competitor of Westiab which did employ members of
Local 3. The court held that these facts were sufficient to state a claim by
Westlab against Freedomland, Local'3 and Sound Systems under the Sherman
Act. It overruled the motion to dismiss.
In U.S. v. Fish Smokers Trade Council, Inc., 160 the following clause, in-
corporated in the labor agreement between a single employer and a union, was
held to be in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act:
In the event that an Employer uses any means for the distri-
bution of its products other than through its own employees,
such as agent-distributors, etc., then such agent-distributors, etc.,
must be members of the union, subject to its rules and regulations.
As an additional reason why the Sherman Act was violated, the court explained
that the independent contractors against whom this clause was leveled were
not subject to organization by the union, so secondary boycott activity against
them could only be a conspiracy to restrain trade and hence was not protected
from the antitrust acts as a restraint "arising out of a labor dispute" and for
a "legitimate objective." The rationale of the court's decision is found in this
quotation:
157 Justice Roberts in his dissent stated:
The course of decision in this Court has now created a situation in which.
by concerted action, unions may set up a wall around a municipality of
millions of inhabitants against importation of any goods if the union is
careful to make separate contracts with each employer, . . .notwithstanding
the fact that the purpose and inevitable result is the stifling of competition
in interstate trade and the creation of a monopoly. 325 U.S. at 819 (1945).
158 46 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
159 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
160 183 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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There is one principal issue raised by the pleadings and that
is whether the jobbers are independent businessmen as plaintiff
maintains and therefore not a proper subject of unionization; if
they are, then it follows that the defendants' alleged activities in
forcing them into the Union and into agreements to allocate their
customers is an act in restraint of trade within the stricture of the
antitrust laws....
The identification of the affected subcontractors as jobbers and hence as inde-
pendent businessmen, not subject to unionization, as one of the reasons why
the activity was not protected by the "Clayton-Norris-LaGuardia-Hutcheson
shield" is significant to the current analysis of implied restrictions on work
movements.
The same rationale was used recently by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Los Angeles Meat Provision Drivers Union. 6 ' There it was held that grease
jobbers, who were the malfeasors, were independent businessmen not subject
to unionization and the restraints on trade were therefore not "protected" from
the antitrust acts. In addition, in this recent decision, the Supreme Court
explained that its decision in the Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton,'62
involved a private antitrust suit brought by a fish buyer to enjoin regulation
of selling prices by a combination of fishermen, joined together as the Pacific
Coast Fishermen's Union. The defendants' claim "that an injunction against
them violated the Norris-LaGuardia Act," was rejected because the restraint
did not arise out of a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. The court pointed out that that statute "was not intended to have appli-
cation to disputes over the sale of commodities." '1 63
From these various decisions there can be extracted series of reasons why
an arbitrator who implies a restriction on the subcontracting of work from the
general provisions of a labor agreement, would be creating a restraint of trade
violative of the Sherman Act.
(1) He would be creating a restraint of trade by an agreement between
a businessman and a labor union. In its Allen Bradley.. decision the Supreme
Court said that such a restraint of trade is not shielded from the Sherman Act.
(2) He would be creating a "commercial restraint" on the sale of goods
and services. Such a restraint is not shielded from the Sherman Act, said the
court in Columbia River Packers Assn. v. Hinton.'6 5
(3) He would be making no effort to determine whether the restraint
affects subcontractors who are independent businessmen, not subject to union-
ization. Such restraints are not protected, said the court in the Los Angeles
Meat Provision Drivers case.1
66
(4) Finally, the arbitrator would face a dilemma caused by the inter-
action of the antitrust acts and the National Labor Relations Act from which
there is no escape.
(a) If the motivation behind the restraint on subcontracting is an economic
161 371 U.S. 94 (1962).
162 315 U.S. 143 (1942).
163 Id. at 145.
164 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
165 315 U.S. 143 (1942).
166 371 U.S. 94 (1962).
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attack upon the subcontractor for not paying union scale, etc., the arbitrator
would be creating a secondary boycott restraint clearly violative of Section
8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act. 6 ' The "legitimate objectives"
standard in the Clayton Act portion of labor's shield from the antitrust act
cannot then apply.
(b) If the restraint on the subcontracting is not part of an economic
attack against the subcontractor, it cannot be said to be an action taken as part
of a labor dispute and then the Norris-LaGuardia portion of the shield which
requires that the restraint be part of a labor dispute does not apply. 6 '
Unions and employers are treading on treacherous ground under the
antitrust acts whenever express limitations upon subcontracting are written
into the agreement. Such a restraint can no longer be considered a protected
restraint growing out of a labor dispute between the union and the subcon-
tractor because if it is an economic attack on the outsider, it clearly violates
Section 8(e). Arbitrators who carry no financial responsibility for what they
do certainly should not impose restrictions by implication which could cause
the taint of illegality to touch the labor contract and the parties.
C. Creating Restrictions on "Work Movements"
Removes An Economic Regulator
Mobility of capital and mobility of labor are necessary in an expanding
economy. The fate of "depressed areas" depends in part upon their ability
to attract new plants and industries, some of which are going to be lured away
from more crowded areas because of lower wage rates. If, then, we assume
that a lawful movement of work made solely for business reasons can violate
by implication a labor contract, the mobility of capital as well as labor is re-
stricted. Such a restriction would prevent an important economic regulator
from operating which, if free to operate, causes plants to be initiated in areas
where the manpower resources are available and costs are lower.
It is also naive to believe that managements can always keep their wage
costs within the competitive "ball park" by not conceding to excessive demands
and "weathering" a strike. The more realistic view is that a management,
when faced with an unreasonable wage cost demand implemented by a threat
of strike, will often agree to raise wage costs and then set about to avoid the
higher cost by (a) automating to eliminate employees; (b) subcontracting part
of the production or services to others who can produce the needed part or
supply the service for less (including the purchase of the needed part from a
subcontractor in Europe or Japan); or (c) moving the production to some
other plant of the company where, because the wage rates and fringe costs are
lower, the production costs are less. The alternative to avoidance of the exces-
sive cost by one of these means is usually the loss of the business to a competitor.
Management, of course, subcontracts work with reluctance. When it
subcontracts work to others who can produce for less, the management loses
the return payable for the managerial services that the management renders.
167 See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
168 See notes 140 and 145 supra and accompanying text.
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If the subcontracting is complete, there is no longer a need for the members
of the production management. Therefore, a management is under a strong
economic compulsion not to subcontract work and will only do so when com-
pelled by economic consideration of sufficient magnitude to offset the loss of
the managerial return and the dilution in the scope of their managerial jobs.
To build restrictions against "work movements" by implication or by
express language is tantamount to building "tariff walls" around plants to
protect the high costs within from outside competition. Once unions are pro-
tected by such "tariff walls" they will, of course, be encouraged to make exces-
sive demands, for then the employer has lost one protective alternative - moving
the work to a lower cost producer.
The possible movement of work is a natural restraint on union abuse in
the collective bargaining process. Absence of natural restraints results in more
governmental intervention. Therefore, arbitrators who imply restrictions on
work movements are removing a natural economic restraint and setting the
stage for more governmental intervention to the ultimate injury of our free
economy.
In addition, some economic analysts believe that other economic "regula-
tors" in addition to "free competition" are functioning within our economy.
An exponent of such a view is John Galbraith, the Harvard economist and
ex-Ambassador to India. In his book, American Capitalism,6 ' Galbraith ex-
plained the check and balance role of opposing power concentrations. He
maintains that against many power concentrations, a natural "countervailing
power" will build up and it will quite effectively prevent the first power con-
centration from being abusive in its dealings. Gabraith explains:...
In fact, new restraints on private power did appear.... [T]hey
appeared not on the same side of the market but on the opposite
side, not with competitors, but with customers or suppliers ...
[P]rivate economic power is held in check by the countervailing
power of those who are subject to it.
Galbraith illustrates his view by pointing out that the big food marketing chains,
as powerful buyers, have been able to use their ability, not only to switch
purchases, but also to threaten direct competitive production in the bargaining
with big millers, canners and meat packers for lower prices. Galbraith believes
that by use of these threats these big food distribution chains have prevented
more price abuse to the food-buying consumer than threats of governmental
antitrust prosecution ever prevented.
This same, more pragmatic, view is applicable here. If unions know that
if they abuse their power and force "too good a deal," an outward "work move-
ment" may occur to the detriment of their members, they will be more moderate.
Therefore, this outward "work movement" consequence of "too good a deal"
should be permitted to operate as a natural check on abuse of union power
and as a better alternative than governmental regulation.
Some arbitrators have candidly said that if they detect as the motivation
for the movement of the work an effort to "beat the union's price," the manage-
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ment action is in "bad faith" and must be stricken down. 1 There is nothing
inherently vicious in "beating the union's price," however unfavorable the
semantics of that phrase, because unions, in a free economy, should have as
much right as anyone else to price themselves out of the market. The freedom
to make a bargain includes the freedom to make one that is too good as well
as one that is not good enough.
III
CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that those arbitrators who, by implication, restrict
the basis upon which an employer can do business with a third party, are
inflicting harm upon our economy. Such restrictions prevent the most economic
utilization of productive capabilities. Because of the increasing invasion of
our markets, both at home and abroad, by foreign competitors, wage earners,
managements, and the general public cannot now afford the luxury of restric-
tions on competition to protect high cost operations, whether they be implied
from the general terms of a labor agreement or set forth in express terms.
And an agreement between a union and the employer that that employer
will not deal with another employer should be considered contrary to Section
8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act whether such restriction has sec-
ondary boycott undertones or not, and whether implied or express. Since
such restraints are commercial restraints between a union and a businessman,
they should not be considered protected from the liabilities under the anti-
trust acts. A secondary boycott can no longer be a "legitimate objective"
under the Clayton Act and, if the restraint is not in the nature of a secondary
boycott, it is not a restraint growing out of a labor dispute under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.
Furthermore, it is submitted that arbitrators who imply restrictions on
"work movements" are doing the institution of arbitration irreparable harm.
Such restrictions come as a surprise to the management negotiators and diminish
management's ability to hold down costs. Managements, who are under pressure
from all persons interested in the enterprise to operate plants effectively, will
reject arbitration as the process to be relied upon to resolve disputes over con-
tract interpretation if such surprise results become characteristic. Only if the
simple and straightforward view, that managements retain all rights to manage
unless they have agreed to limit these rights, is adopted generally, can thought-
ful managements support this important institution.
171 Gulf Oil Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. 852 (D. A. Crawford, 1959):
Such a broad interpretation of the company's right to manage runs counter
to the Recognition Clause. . . . For if the Company can subcontract a
bargaining unit job whenever it can get it done at less than union rates,
the union is faced with the impossible alternative of having the work
concerning which it has bargained with the Company removed from the
bargaining unit or agreeing to the performance of the job by its members
at less than the agreed upon contract rates.
